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ON ROMAN INGARDEN’S VIEWS OF LANGUAGE


1. Foreword

Deliberations on language can be found in most of Roman Ingarden’s writings, beginning with the paper “O pytaniach esencjalnych” [“On Essential Questions”] (1935) and the book The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature. With an Appendix on the “Functions of Language in the Theatre” (1973), (which includes all the distinctive features of what he called his philosophy of language) as well as the two-volume Controversy over the Existence of the World (1947-1948) and as far as the posthumous paper “O sądzie kategorycznym i jego roli w poznaniu” [“On Categorial Judgement and Its Role in Cognition”] (1972). Within fifty years of his scientific work, Ingarden did not considerably change his semiotic ideas, but he did add a new justification for some and softened his ideas on some others — previously judged as ones that cannot be undermined.

One can have reservations as far as the way some views are presented, but still hold the very views to be true, but one could question the very views, as well. Ingarden’s views of language can be of both sorts. The former presents two issues. First, there are a number of phrases in Ingarden’s works that are meant to facilitate a live following of his argumentation. They in fact bring up associations that pose a major hindrance in the comprehension of his thoughts that the expressions are supposed to notify one of. Second, the setting forth of a position seems to be too lengthy and not clear enough. Incidentally, both flaws might have resulted from the fact that
Ingarden was a passionate reader of *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901), *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913) and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) by Edmund Husserl and *Logic* by Alexander Pfä nder. The language of these works was closer to what the contemporary reader might call the heavy kind used by the 19th century German thinkers than the kind of language introduced and made popular in late 19th and early 20th century Poland by the writings of Kazimierz Twardowski. Twardowski did influence both Husserl and Ingarden (who must have known his writings just as well as the those by Husserl) but Ingarden was not as enthusiastic about Twardowski as he was about Husserl; more so, Ingarden was clearly biased against the writings of some of Twardowski’s disciples.¹

The opposition to the vocabulary and argumentation cannot suffice to reject a position, including Ingarden’s. Justice needs to be done to him: he gradually liberated himself from the impact of Husserlian language and the later his works, the more evident it becomes. Ingarden himself demonstrated thus, that his position could be presented in a less complicated manner. I have endeavoured to undertake my own unravelling of Ingarden’s position, aware of the dangers of the so-called paradox of explanation. An awareness of these dangers does not prevent me from stating it with force that there are no reliable views that are uttered in one language only. It is only that some languages are better suited for that than others and, luckily, these are the languages in common use.

The thing is that Ingarden’s views, even though expressed in apparently more flexible language, can arouse reservations of the latter nature. These are about the INNER contradictions and also the TOTALITY of Ingarden’s position, which I have made a note of in the footnotes; I have included my general reservations in the last chapter.

2. Reconstruction of the Position

2.1. Language Signs and Formations

The words, phrases, sentences and complexes of sentences² are called language formations by Ingarden. Comparing signs and linguistic formations, Ingarden

¹See note 65.
²Complexes of sentences are, for Ingarden: a story, a novel, an epic poem, a drama, a scientific paper, a theory, a proof and even a regular conversation. A complex of sentences is something more than a cluster of sentences. Firstly, in a complex of sentences some semantic components of sentences forming a unit are changed and as a result there is a change in the substance of the correlates of these sentences. Secondly,
concedes that they are similar in some way as both are peculiar subjects that fulfil certain tasks. This is what Ingarden means when he calls them two-stratum or two-sided objects, made up of the outer appearance and the function performed. However, the two sides differ considerably.3

The most essential difference concerns the second stratum, i.e. the function. Ingarden follows Husserl in his view that an object is a sign when it signifies another object, other than itself and it justifies the existence of that other object with its own existence and, more precisely — evokes a certitude of the existence of the signifier. So, a rash can be a sign of an allergy, smoke can be a sign of fire, etc. Also, it is not necessary that there be a causal connection between the signifier and the signified. Looking at that from this angle, the object which in the traffic code is called a road sign is a sign, too. What has been said above cannot be said of all language formations: words that Ingarden calls functional words4 do not signify, i.e. do not refer to any object. Also, among the language formations that do signify something, not all evoke a certitude of the existence of that which they signify. This is the case with some names.5 Lastly, even if some formations continually involve such a certitude (and this is the case with judicative propositions), this certitude is unrelated to the existence of those formations but, rather, with the activity to which these formations serve as tools, that is the act of judgement. However, judging is not always an outcome. Language formations can be used to describe an imaginary rather than real world, though.6

The difference in the first stratum is about the outer appearance of signs being a concrete object-token, whereas the manifestation of language formations is a typical form.7 The original form of a language formation’s

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3Alas, it is likely that these parts of Ingarden’s argumentation can be substantially distorted as they have been included in a redaction of his university lectures. This redaction, made by Danuta Gierulanka, was in fact being reviewed and amended by Ingarden himself but was not (due to his death) finally endorsed.

4See below in 2.4.

5Cf. below 2.3. point 5.

6As regards images, which Ingarden most likely would not have included as signs, he sees their function as presentation. Images mainly present thanks to their similitude to the object presented, whereas language formations — even if they do — make representations thanks to the intentionality bestowed on them rather than of their own, thanks to some original properties (cf. below, towards the end of 2.2).

7Sign-tokens are commonly seen in opposition to sign-types, the former being real objects, determined in time and space, and the latter — sets of signs that are same (to be precise, almost the same) in terms of appearance. Ingarden opposes this
manifestation is a sound. The graphic representations that can replace sounds are secondary appearances of a language formation. To Ingarden, the surface structure of a language formation is not its phonic token, not some voice medium, not a single utterance; it is not a single nor real — and thus temporal (as pertaining to time and space) — object. This is not to say that the sound is a species, as would Husserl. Ingarden noticed that sounds undergo transformations along with the development of the language. When a language formation (its appearance) is being perceived, a modification of perception occurs: perception is replaced with selective perception; this is how a uniquely existing object appears that is not real but neither ideal — it is changeable in time. This is what Ingarden calls a shape quality\(^8\) and this is what he identifies sound type with. Shape quality is a self-contained object.\(^9\) It has a foundation in the so-called simple ideal qualities; it constitutes an arrangement of their concretisations, i.e. it cannot be brought down to a mere set of these concretisations. Even less so is it a set of properties or, more broadly, parts recurrent in a number of instances of sound-tokens. The latter are only sorts of sense base, i.e. a realisation of sound-type, and hence a realisation of what constitutes an appearance of a language formation; in those, sound type only becomes manifested, i.e., realised.

This can be illustrated by the word *moon*. The sound type under discussion is an arrangement of certain phonemes\(^{10}\): m, u:, n; these concretise specific and unchangeable phoneme-patterns that have simple ideal qualities. Surely, everyone will pronounce the word differently. Each utterance will only be a sound-token, a parole. One lasting for a certain determined duration, will only be a real sentence rather than a stratum of a language formation.

2.2. Meaning

The description of the second component of a language formation, i.e., meaning (in Ingarden’s terms), needs explaining, the concept of the so-called intentionality. The term is borrowed by Ingarden from Husserl, whose understanding of type.

\(^8\) For a while Ingarden took shape quality for a kind of ideal object. Eventually he concluded that only some types have a shape essence.

\(^9\) See note 15.

\(^{10}\) A set of phonemes creating the word-sound is, in Ingarden’s opinion characterised by some absolute properties, such as pitch, length, intensity (stress distribution), as well as relative ones (derivative of meaning or the signifier), i.e. what linguists call markedness of an emotional (vulgarity, indecency), stylistic (scientific, literary quality) or an environmental kind.
lengthy deliberations concerning the issue of intentionality elaborate on the ideas of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski. On account of his obvious kindred, numerous references will be made to the two of them when reconstructing Ingarden’s semiotic views.

To Ingarden, intentionality is supposed to be a property of a specific, sort of active, relationship between objects. This relationship — INTENTION or, in other words, conjecture — obtains between object $x$ and object $y$, when object $x$, which Ingarden calls an intent object, goes as if beyond itself and points to object ‘$y$’ — an intentional object. The intentional object ‘$y$’, which intention measures, is also different from the intent object ‘$x$’ and external to the very intention. If the intentional object exists self-containedly and independently vis-a-vis the intent object$^{11}$ (so as if it is the Husserlian tout court object), Ingarden calls it an ALSO-intentional object. If, however, it has been generated by the intent object — and hence exists self-containedly and dependently in regard to it, and is therefore a fully fictitious object (the Husserlian object as conjectured), then Ingarden calls it a PURELY intentional object.$^{12}$ Incidentally, the distinctions do occur in Twardowski’s writings, too.$^{13}$

Intentionality in its original form only refers to experiences that Husserl calls acts. Acts — intentional experiences (Ingarden would say “intent experiences”) — are distinguished by Husserl from non-intentional experiences, that is impressions and imaginary contents (apparitions).

Take this example: Stanislaus is looking at the Moon. The intent object will here be a perception, and more specifically: perceiving Stanislaus; the intentional object — an also-intentional object at that — will be the Moon. Now, suppose that the sky has suddenly become overcast and Stanislaus is just thinking about the Moon or imagining it. This contemplated or imagined Moon, as the object of Stanislaus’s thought or imagination, will then be a purely intentional object. Moreover, it will be a so-called ORIGINALLY purely intentional object, as an immediate product of an act — Stanislaus’s thought or imagination. It can be metaphorically said that in this case Stanislaus brings this object — the Moon — into existence and arbitrarily assigns its attributes. This cannot be said of the Moon that Stanislaus saw before. No effort by Stanislaus’s consciousness will make the Moon cease to exist, and neither will it add or subtract any of its qualities. Also, an

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$^{11}$See note 15.

$^{12}$Despite the distinction, in specific points Ingarden does not make it very clear which of the objects he means on a specific occasion; cf. note 27.

$^{13}$Cf. K. Twardowski (1965, p. 4).
also-intentional object cannot be internally contradictory; the Moon seen by Stanislaus cannot be at the same time round and triangular. However, a purely intentional moon can contain an inner contradiction. This is enabled by a certain detail of a purely intentional object’s structure.

According to Ingarden, there are three distinctive features for any object’s structure: formal structure, material structure and existential character. In other words, every object has a form and properties and exists in a certain mode.

The structure of a purely intentional object is in part described by the very name: purely intentional object. It is then an object, and a thing in particular, so it has a formal structure of a thing. Next, it is an intentional object; intentionality is one of details of its material structure. More than that: it is a purely intentional object, i.e., non-self-contained — this is its existential character. A peculiarity of a purely intentional object is having the so-called content. The property of having content is a moment — or a non-autonomous part — of the material structure of a purely intentional object. This content has in turn a formal structure, material structure and an existential character, which is such and only such as the intent object ascribes

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14 See below: 2.3.1. and 2.6 towards the end of section.
15 According to Ingarden, in terms of the mode of existence, any object can be:
   a. real, i.e. temporal (emerging, changing in the course of its life and dying);
   b. ideal, (only possible?) i.e. timeless (unchangeable);
   c. purely intentional (see below).

Real objects are, for Ingarden, stones, plants, animals, celestial bodies, but also e.g. the falling of stones, the growth of plants and the positive properties of animals, the gravity of celestial bodies. To Ingarden, ideal objects include ideal notions (eventually he denied any existence of them; see below) ideal entities (a specific triangle, number 5, but not a polygon), ideas (such as the idea of a parallelogram) and ideal qualities (such as red). Literary or musical works of art, state, law are seen by Ingarden as purely intentional objects. The mode of being the object depends on whether it exists self-contained or non-self-contained, originally or derivatively, independently or dependently, and whether it is autonomous or heteronomous. Self-containedness-non-self-containedness, autonomy-heteronomy, originality-derivativity and independence-dependence are all called by Ingarden moments of being. An object exists self-containedly if it is self-determined; it is non-self-contained if its essential properties have been bestowed on it (from outside). An object exists originally if by its nature it cannot be created by another object, i.e. if it could not fail to exist; it exists derivatively — if it requires a one-time creation or continual re-creation. An object is autonomous if it needs no co-existence with another object within one whole; it is heteronomous if it does. Finally, an object is dependent if it needs another independent (separate) object for its persistence. Thus, every individual thing is distinctive for Ingarden, God in the Christian sense is an original object, any property is heteronomous, whereas any human being is a dependent object (e.g. in relation to oxygen).
to it. The formal structure of the content of a purely intentional object is something completely different than the formal structure of the object itself. The same holds for material structure and existential characterisation. Therefore, Ingarden speaks of a dual structure of a purely intentional object.

Coming back to Stanislaus imagining the Moon. It appears to him as a celestial body (the formal structure of a thing) contained in our solar system (real existential character) and having such and such traits: sphericity (some material structure). The imagined Moon is only the content of Stanislaus’s presentation (or, more precisely: of the presented object), with the representation (more specifically: the represented object) only an intentional rather than real object, and as such it is non-self-contained; apart from this, it has a number of properties that a Moon as content does not have.

Stanislaus’s imagination (more specifically: the presented object) described above is his own product: it is an originally purely intentional object and unavailable for anyone but Stanislaus. The above description could then have only been made by Stanislaus alone. The originally purely intentional object, along with Ingarden’s ideas, is a monosubjective object. But there are also purely intentional objects that are intersubjective, i.e. universally cognizable, and then we have to do with what Ingarden calls derivative intentionality. A derivatively purely intentional object is a direct product of an activity by the consciousness. It has its origin in objects of a derivative intentionality. A derivatively purely intentional object becomes universally available at the cost of the so-called schematization or, as Twardowski would put it, expanding the field of generality.\(^{16}\) This kind of schematization is about an impoverishment of the material structure of content as compared with, say, the contents of the imagined object. In yet other words, a derivatively purely intentional object is indeterminate in terms of some material moments: it contains some unknown values, which Ingarden calls spots of indeterminacy, which demand the removal.

Such derivatively purely intentional objects are generated by some language formations.

Back to Stanislaus, imagining the Moon in a cloudy night. Imaging is an activity of Stanislaus’s consciousness and as such is an originally intent object. It means that it generates an originally purely intentional object; here it is the imagined Moon. But the Moon does not have to be imagined by Stan to be a purely intentional object — it can also be determined by some language formation, that is the very word Moon. The sequence

\(^{16}\)Cf. Twardowski (1965: 139).
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

Stanislaus — image — imaged Moon will now correspond to the sequence: sound-type *Moon* — the meaning of the word *Moon* — the signified Moon. A live imaginative experience will now be substituted by a meaning. It will be in the same relation to the image as the light from the real Moon to the light from the real Sun. Lunar light is light reflected from the Sun — this meaning is a borrowed intention, one given in a unique intentional experience. The Moon is only a transmitter or the light from the Sun — neither is a word-sound of a language formation a source but, rather, a vehicle of a borrowed intention. The object enlightened by lunar light is dim and vague — as an intentional object of a language formation. Ingarden would say here: an intentional correlate, it is schematic, a shadow of a imagined object; it is a derivatively intentional object.

Now it can be seen more clearly how a language formation (an autonomous one\(^\text{17}\)) is built. A language formation in its original form is a peculiar object, consisting of sound-type and meaning. Sound-type is a concretisation of simple ideal qualities and can be realised as concrete sound-token. Meaning as a derivative intention or a unit of derivative intentions is in itself a product of the special activity of consciousness. As a product of experience, it is external to it and also non-self-contained. Therefore, in order that it may exist independently from the mother experience (which is not to say independently from whatever), it needs to be sort of bound to the word-sound. As an intention, it is a reference to a derivatively purely intentional object which, as opposed to, say, an imagined object generated directly by an activity of consciousness, is universally cognitively available. But in order for that to be possible, a persistent identity of the object is necessary, and hence also of its indirect source, i.e. a meaning. Only in this case will sound-type refer any user of language to the same correlate — an intentional object — as related to a meaning of the same orientation.

According to Ingarden, a word, such as *Moon*, is UNDERSTOOD when:

(a) the sound (or symbol) of a word, e.g, the sound *Moon*, is perceived in a modified manner (type-oriented);

(b) associated sounds are taken up or actualised by a meaning attached to the sound by the so-called meaning-generating activity; it detects its moments, and in so —

(c) it apprehends an intentional correlate of a word, in this situation — Moon. In brief, a language formation is understood if and when an act is

\(^{17}\)Cf. below, mid-section 2.4.
performed, which Husserl calls a sign act. Initially, Ingarden posits that an identical understanding of a language formation by different users of language is only made possible thanks to the existence of the co-called ideal notions. Those ideal notions, ideal intentions that mark ideal objects (ideas), would be the unchangeable models of meaning, cognizable, like all ideal objects, by means of a special kind of perception called ideation. A specific word meaning (but not sentence meaning) would only be some partial actualization\(^{18}\) of an ideal notion (as the reality is an imperfect actualisation of the world of ideas).

So, an ideal notion _Moon_ would mark a full set of the properties of Moon, whereas in a concrete use of the word “Moon” we would be dealing with a finite set of properties (for instance, a shiny disc that sometimes glitters in a cloudless sky).

The fact of there being no grounds for the acceptance of the existence of the whole domain of ideal notions became evident for Ingarden in the end: otherwise, from the beginning he had declined to clearly define what those ideal notions should be. He finally rejected the whole phantasmal universe of notional constants. This way, however, the issue of the identity of meaning remained open to Ingarden, and his whole conception came to a deadlock. Ingarden tried to overcome this state of affairs later by claiming that the meaning of language formations is intersubjectively available, as language itself is a social artefact, an intersubjective one — a product of collective cooperation. On the other hand, he maintained that language is a _condition_ for the formation of a social bond, and thus not an _effect_ of that bond. But he neither explained what this bond was to be nor what this cooperation was to be about. That identity and intersubjectivity of language formations involve their frequent use in living speech cannot be regarded as such an explanation.

2.3. Kinds of Meaning

Any act, i.e. an intentional (or, to be precise, intent) experience always determines only one intentional object. It makes it in the way that, if it is an autonomous act, then:

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\text{(1) in some way it grasps the content of the object,}
\]

\(^{18}\)Here, the actual moments of meaning can occur explicitly or implicitly, with potential ones — implicitly only.
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

(2) ascribes this content SOME properties and

(3) SOME structure

(4) establishes SOME way of its existence and

(5) establishes its existence SOMEHOW.

Depending on what the VARIABLE details of the experience are in a given case, it may take a relevant form. Therefore:

(1) An intentional object can be grasped in two different ways. The object of the experience can thus be, as it were, grasped with one ray of consciousness, sort of captured as something ready, as a whole or as a subject of possible properties (substantia). Such grasping could be called an indication (e.g. the pecking of a woodpecker). If, however, the object of an experience is grasped incrementally, in a temporal aspect, sort of distributed in several rays of consciousness as something occurring as a state of affairs, then we are dealing with exhibiting (that the woodpecker is pecking).

(2) An experience can ascribe various properties to the content of its intentional object.

(3) Objects can have different structures: they can be things (such as a chair), actions (such as riding), events (e.g. a fall), relations (e.g. being-greater-than), properties (e.g. gaudiness) or states: proprietary (the leaves are faded yellow) or active (the leaves rustle). An experience can ascribe any kind of structure to the content of an intentional object.

(4) Furthermore, the type of existence is established in an experience: whether the content of an intentional object exists really, ideally or intentionally.

(5) Finally, the existence of an intentional object’s content can be established in many ways. The content MAY EXIST, or it CERTAINLY EXISTS, or it (IS UNKNOWN) IF IT EXISTS, or it DOES NOT EXIST, or, finally, LET IT EXIST (we want it to exist).

Husserl mentions only some of the details listed here. According to him, the intention, i.e. the intentional essence of an act can:
(a) have a different quality, i.e. it can be single-rayed (simple) or multi-rayed (complex); a single-rayed intention is indication while a multi-rayed one — exhibiting (1);

(b) have different content material, i.e. it can ascribe different properties to an intentional object (3);

(c) establish the existence of an intentional object in many ways (5); Husserl recognizes two ways of establishing existence: unconditional establishment (where the object surely exists) and permission (where it may exist).

Ingarden features all the above moments of intention, albeit considered in reference to a derivative intention, and thus tied to the sound of a language formation. It is these that are found hidden in Ingarden’s terms: an intentional directional indicator (1), material content (2), formal content (3), existential characteristics (4) and an existential thesis (5). These moments — or component intentions — create what can be called a basic kernel of an autonomous meaning. They form a coherent whole, co-operate with each other, are strictly interconnected and interdependent — in short, these are moments only. Also, as Ingarden stresses, they can occur implicitly (functionally) or explicitly (clearly stated).\(^\text{19}\)

Equivalent to the Husserlian division of intentions (intentionality) into the single-rayed and multi-rayed is Ingarden’s distinction between the objectivising (static) intention and the synthetic intention. Ingarden adds another — the dynamic intention.\(^\text{20}\) The dynamic intention is one that spreads as if its intentional correlate (not in a multi-rayed fashion, though) as a course, becoming as an activity. This is in total opposition to the static intention, but it does find its necessary complementation in it. The dynamic intention is heteronomous.\(^\text{21}\) The static and dynamic intentions are synthesised in the synthetic intention, which is in fact a unique collection of intentions. The static and dynamic intentions intertwine as if to create two rays of synthetic intention. Therefore Ingarden also calls them the static-dynamic intention.

The differences in the quality of meaning, mentioned above, are also described by Ingarden by means of the term intentional directional indicator. The static intention is one having an intentional directional indicator; the dynamic intention has none.

\(^{19}\)See note 18.

\(^{20}\)Ingarden himself maintains that he did that under the influence of Henri Bergson, whose ideas he got acquainted with when writing his doctoral dissertation.

\(^{21}\)See below, 2.4.
In terms of the quality of the pertinent derivative intention, i.e. meaning, all (autonomous) language formations can be broken into names, characterised by the static intention, verbs that betray the dynamic intention and sentences, which involve the synthetic intention. Ingarden considers in detail the different kinds of meaning or, otherwise, semantic units trying to describe what differentiates them qualitatively.

2.3.1. Name

In the full meaning of name all the moments of derivative intention Ingarden describes can be found: an intentional directional indicator (1), material content (2), formal content (3), existential characteristics (4) and existential thesis (5). Material content, formal content, and existential characteristics together form what for Husserl is the content of the investigated intention. The intentional directional factor determines its quality. It turns, as Ingarden points out, to the constitutive nature — i.e. individual nature — of the purely intentional correlate. The formal structure of the substance (the structure of the thing, activity, event, relation, property or state) is determined by the formal content, with all these structures being expressed nominally, and thus as a subject of possible properties (properties, too, become the subjects of properties).

The moments (1)-(5) are supposed to be the moments of the lexicon meaning of name, i.e. of an isolated meaning, one separated from the context. In other words, according to Ingarden, name itself not only fulfils the function of signifying and meaning, and thus it not only determines what it names (the constitutive nature of the content of the intentional correlate) but also

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22 A semantic unit, other than name, verb and sentence, is, according to Ingarden, also a complex of sentences (cf. note 2). Its intentional correlate are presented objects (the term is not used here in the sense attributed to it by Twardowski) by states of affairs being correlates to component syntactic meanings. It is unclear whether the presented reality constitutes one intentional correlate, i.e. whether the generality of the assertion that one semantic unit corresponds to one intentional object is preserved.

23 The word full is here in no relation to the Husserlian fullness of intention (cf. p. 341). Ingarden speaks of the full meaning as opposed to one in a more narrow sense, identical with a moment of the material content of the full meaning. Likewise, Husserl uses the word “representation”. In a broader meaning it is intention in general; in a narrower sense — the very content of the intention. Perhaps what Ingarden also means is to emphasise that he is examining the isolated nominal meaning. Since in context, some moments are either modified or even eliminated (cf. 2.4).

24 Ingarden hesitated as to whether this moment occurs in the full isolated nominal word meaning or if it appears only later, when the name is used in the sentence.

25 In some languages, this moment is clearly marked by the so-called article.

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WHICH properties of that something are (the material and formal structure of the content). A name settles WHETHER and HOW the indicated and determined object exists (the existential character and existential thesis of the content of the intentional correlate).

Take the meaning of the name *bow*:

1. it refers to something — namely to the bow;
2. it determines that this object is a wooden stick, with a head at one end, a frog at the other, and a strand of hair between those;
3. determines the object is a thing;
4. settles it is a real thing;
5. settles that this thing exists.

The meaning of the word *redness* (with the so-called accountable usage):

1. it refers to something, i.e. to redness;
2. it determines it being a shade of the first band of the rainbow;
3. it determines it to be a property;
4. it settles that it is a real property;
5. it settles that the property exists.

Usually, a distinction is made between singular nouns (e.g. *a chisel*) and plural nouns (e.g. *chisels*), but also between proper names (e.g. *Goplo*) and generic names (e.g. *a lake*). For Ingarden it will be equivalent — in the first case — to that, depending on — in the first case — HOW MANY objects are being targeted, the directional factor can be:

(a) single-rayed\(^{26}\) — in the case of a singular name;

\(^{26}\)The single- (and multi-)radiance of the directional factor ought not to be confused with the Husserlian single- (and multi-)radiance of an act.
(b) multi-rayed\textsuperscript{27} — in the case of a plural name;

while — in the other case — in terms of how many objects can consecutively determine the meaning, of which this index is a moment, it can be:

(a) fixed, i.e. indicating some specific object — this is the case in proper nouns;

(b) changeable, i.e. it indicates any object from a set determined by the material content, which is the case in generic names.

The traditional way of defining a name is about giving its \textit{genus proximum} and \textit{differentia specifica}. The expression thus formed — a compound name — signifies the same object as the defined name. Therefore it is sometimes said that this defining expression is a meaning of the defined name. The defining expression is a more precise name of the object being signified by the defined name in so far as it not only names the object but also makes a clear specification of some of its properties — at least \textit{differentiam specificam}. By defining \textit{cottage} as a \textit{peasant log cabin} we do realise that its building material must necessarily be some specific kind of wood, such as pine, spruce or larch, but \textit{what} the material is like is secondary in the sense that whatever the material may be (pine, spruce or larch) — much as it needs to be some kind — the cottage will remain a cottage.

Ingarden describes this phenomenon by saying that the material content of the meaning of the name contains the so-called constant moments, i.e. he unambiguously determines that what is meant is a \textit{timber} house, and the so-called variable moments, that it does not settle whether the timber is pine, spruce or larch, even though, obviously, a house needs to be built from a specific kind of wood.

\textsuperscript{27}It is unclear how this metaphor by Ingarden should be interpreted, if any intention — and so the derivative one, too — refers to only one intentional object. What is the intentional correlate of the name \textit{houses} supposed to look like? When Twardowski defended the uniqueness of the object of an experience, i.e. the live intention, (cf. Twardowski 1965: 83 and the following) his reasoning could have been considered convincing. In Ingarden’s writings, in reference to the “dead” intention, i.e. the meaning, this reasoning loses the value of evidence. It is possible that, in constructing his theory of meaning, Ingarden tends to confuse the relationship between a language formation and its purely intentional formation with the relationship between a language formation and the also intentional correlate.
Notwithstanding, there are many properties of the object being signified which are not specified in the definition even in such a rudimentary manner as is the case with the specific kind of wood for the peasant’s home. Any definition of a name — even the fullest — falls short of stating all the properties of the name being named. Ingarden calls it the incompleteness of the material content of meaning. This incompleteness of the material content of meaning is supposed to be about occurrences within it of actual (really existing) moments, and the so-called potential (possible) moments. Initially (when, after Husserl, he accepted the existence of ideal notions) Ingarden associated the incompleteness of the material content of meaning with the fact that it was supposed to be (as mentioned above) only a partial actualisation of a specific ideal notion. Non-actualised moments of the content of ideal notion were to be just these potential moments of the material content of meaning.

A recognition of the occurrence of actual and potential moments of the material content of meaning allows to explain what is the equivalence of names. The name Moon and the name celestial body going around Earth are equivalent (equirange), even though their purely intentional correlates have different contents, and are thus different objects; remember, the content of a purely intentional object has only these properties which are assigned to it by the content of the intention. Nevertheless, both names are equivalent because they actualise a part of the content of the same ideal notion — even if each actualises a different one. The elimination of ideal notions from the domain of existing objects, even given an expanded sense of existence, ruins with one blow this part of Ingarden’s argumentation, too.

2.3.2. Verb

As opposed to the nominal meaning, a full meaning of a (finite) verb is heteronomous; thanks to that we can speak of a sentence-forming role of a finite verb. This heteronomy stems from the fact that the meaning of an isolated verb does have a material content and formal content that defines the structure of the activity, but is deprived of the intentional directional indicator (its non-existence determines the quality of meaning of the verb) and the moment of existential characterisation, with the existential thesis of

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28In exceptional cases the formal content of a verbal meaning does not determine the structure of the occurrence of the activity but it does determine a structure close to the structure of (pertaining to) property. After Pfänder, Ingarden gives the following examples: The sky blues, i.e. is blue, Grass greens, i.e. is green.
the meaning of the verb being a potential thesis. Two new moments appear in it, though, which the nominal word meaning does not have:

(6) verbal directional indicator;
(7) objective directional indicator — with transitive verbs.

The verbal directional indicator is a so-called reflexive index, i.e. it does not reflect towards the intentional correlate of the verb, and thus not to the activity, but to something other than this correlate. It turns to the subject of the activity, i.e. to its agent, but without determining the material and formal structure and the modes and fact of its existence. It can all happen in only a sentence. The verbal indicator tends to be — like the nominal indicator — single-rayed or multi-rayed but it is always potential, in the case of an isolated verb. The objective directional indicator turns to the object of the activity — to the correlate of the name which is the object. The meaning of a transitive verb can have two such indicators: one referring to the correlate of the direct object, the other to the correlate of the indirect object.

As can be seen, according to Ingarden, a verb that is isolated and abstracted from the context determines what (2) activity (3) is taking place, assuming some subject (6) and sometimes also object (7) of the activity, but without going into detail. Take the meaning of the verb *sings*:

(2) determines that what is meant is a vocal utterance of sounds with a specific pitch;
(3) determines that it is anyway some activity;
(6) indicates a subject of this activity (such as a man);
(7) indicates an object (such as a song).

The difference between the meaning of a verb and the meaning of a name becomes more evident if we juxtapose the verb under consideration with the name 'singing' in one meaning of this otherwise plurisignant word (closest to the meaning of the verb discussed). According to Ingarden, with the same material (2) and formal (3) content, the moments (6) and (7) will disappear but a directional indicator (1) will be added, thanks to which the activity will be apprehended as an object of possible properties and a moment of the existential characterisation (4) and existential thesis (5).
2.3.3. Sentence

The meaning\textsuperscript{29} of a sentence\textsuperscript{30} is a synthetic intention, i.e. static-dynamic. It is different from a simple nominal and verbal word meaning in that more of its moments can be clearly propounded as it is a whole built from a number of words. None the less it marks — as does any meaning or intention — only one intentional correlate. The same can be said of plurisignant sentences (in this case the correlate sort of flickers, shines and opalises).

Ingarden openly confesses that he is unable to demonstrate all the details of the sentential meaning. He constrains himself to marking some varieties of the formal content of sentential meaning, that is the moment defining the formal structure of the intentional correlate of the sentence and the varieties of the existential thesis — the differences are the ways of establishing the existence of this content.

So, sentences can mark, i.a., the intentional correlates, whose contents have a structure of a state of affairs, relation of being or an issue. A state of affairs\textsuperscript{31} — more specifically: the state of the essence of a thing or the state of occurrence — is an intentional correlate of the meaning of an affirmative unconditional sentence. This is illustrated in: *The book is boring*, *Wife is sleeping*. An affirmative conditional sentence refers to an existential connection, and in particular, to the heteronomy or dependence of the state of affairs marked by the main clause. For instance: *If the fiddler pulls the bow more forcibly along the string, the sound drawn out will peal out more loudly*. Finally the intentional correlate of an interrogative sentence — an issue — is a state of affairs including an (material or existential) unknown calling for elimination. For instance: *Is Swaróg a god of all Slavs?*

The existential thesis of sentential meaning is called by Ingarden a moment of stating. Then stating of the existence of the content of an intentional object can be a:

(a) conditional, i.e. admittance (the intention settles: *The object may exist*);

\textsuperscript{29} Ingarden almost always speaks of the content or sense of the sentence rather than its meaning, without explaining the reasons why he does so.

\textsuperscript{30} Ingarden calls the sentence itself a coherent system of places and a unity of properly assorted functions.

\textsuperscript{31} Ingarden sees the following connections holding between thing, property and a state of affairs: a thing (e.g. rose) is an object of properties (e.g. the redness of a rose), i.e. the states of affairs (e.g. a rose is red) that have been sort of contracted. In other words, a state of affairs is an expansion of its properties. It is worth adding that in the name “state of affairs” Ingarden puts the second component as a noun in the genitive SINGULAR.
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

(b) free-from-reservation (The object surely exists);
(c) non-firm, i.e. assumption (The object may exist);
(d) uncertain, i.e. a question (It is unknown whether the object exists)
(e) preclusive (Object does not exist);
(f) postulating (Let the object exist).

Each of these varieties\textsuperscript{32} can also occur in a proper form (as an accountable, meant stating) and then the sentence is said to claim a right to truthfulness, relevance, validity, etc., or in a seeming form (quasi-stating). What a kind of stating takes place, depends on the original activity, which the sentential intention is associated with?

2.4. Heteronomous formations

The moment a simple language formation becomes an element of a complex language formation, its full meaning undergoes changes — new moments of being appear or the existing ones are modified, thanks to which the formation comes to fulfil some syntactic functions. The mentioned changes are marked, i.a., by the very place in a complex language formation, by suitable grammatical forms, by the manner of utterance (and in the case of the written language — by punctuation, capitalization, etc.) or, finally, by some kinds of language formations, which Ingarden calls functional words. In the case of a name in the genitive,\textsuperscript{33} which forms a part of a complex language formation, the direction of the nominal intentional indicator changes, thanks to which identification occurs between the name’s own intentional object and the object of the name being determined and, as a result, a closer specification of the latter object. The correlate of the language formation buffalo mane is buffalo mane and not buffalo and mane because the correlate of the latter component of the formation becomes as if affixed and identifies with the correlate of the first (main) component. This is what the syntactic function of attribute is about: it does not designate any object but it describes an object designated by the name in regard to which it is an attribute. Obviously, it

\textsuperscript{32}According to Ingarden, also the existential position of the meaning of a noun can have varieties analogous to those asserting existence by judgment, mentioned before.

\textsuperscript{33}Apparently, the same pertains to an adjectival name; on the heteronomy of adjectives see below, end of 3.
entails a change of the existential characterisation; the correlate is described as existing heteronomously with regard to the object, whose property it is to be. Thus a name becomes a heteronomous language formation, albeit heteronomous in ways other than a verb. The heteronomy of verbal meaning was in that it contained a moment directing itself to a an intentional correlate of a different entity, i.e. (6) or sometimes (7). Other than that, as opposed to the meaning of an attributive name, verbal meaning had its own correlate, determined (in the content) materially, formally and existentially.

Closer to verbal heteronomy is the sort of heteronomy which pertains to the name that plays the syntactic function of the logical subject in the sentence, which in Polish is marked mostly by the nominative. In the meaning of the subjectival name there appears a moment of a sort of deviation of its own formal content (3) and existential thesis (5) towards the material content (2) and existential position (5) of the verb. The subject of properties marked by the meaning of the name that functions as the logical subject of the sentence, becomes ready, as it were, to receive what has been attributed to it by the material content of the verb. Respectively, the existential thesis of the subject lends, as it were, the base to the verbal thesis. Verbal meaning, which as an isolated semantic unit is a heteronomous creation, only undergoes this change in the function of a logical predicate that then occurs in it an actualisation of the reflexive directional indicator and existential thesis, that is their apparent embedding, as it were, on the respective moments of a subject word meaning.

The kinds of heteronomy described so far resulted either from the modification of language formations, which as isolated formations had autonomous meanings, i.e. marked their own intentional correlate (attributive and subjectival names), or from the presence of moments indicating another intentional object, too, (verbs) in a meaning, generating its own intentional correlate.

There are language formations, however, whose heteronomy is about their not generating their intentional correlate at all (thus rid of the moment of content) but only perform functions with regard to meanings or intentional correlates of language formations, with which they can co-occur. It can therefore be said that these artefacts, which Ingarden calls non-objective artefacts or functional words, have no meaning at all, at least not in the sense

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34Obviously, names too (thanks to cases) and finite verbs can perform various functions, but that does not account for all their meanings.

35According to Ingarden, functors are not only words but also grammar forms, modifying the meanings of language formations, and definitely so are punctuation marks (such as the interrogative “?”, which fulfils a role that is similar to the word
in which meaning pertains to names, verbs and sentences. Functional words are different from the latter — that is formations that have a accountable objective meanings — in that the functions performed by this words usually have not many heterogeneous moments, as do the meanings of names, verbs or sentences. And even if in some uses they do perform different functions, these are mutually autonomous; these can be separated and assigned to different functional words (cf. the apportionment of the functional word “is” from an absolute affirmative sentence into: the predicative function “exists” and a stating function “I claim that”). This is impossible in relation to the moments of the meaning of names, verbs or sentences.

Ingarden points to several kinds of functional words:

(a) interrogative (e.g. when, what, how many, how, where);

(b) factual (e.g. after, later, when, during, beside, where, behind, at, to), that is those which establish some factual connection, so they resemble a moment of material content of the meaning of autonomous formation;

(c) demonstrative (e.g. this, that, here) corresponding to the intentional directional indicator of nominal meaning;

(d) those that merge sentences into larger sentential compounds (e.g. and, with, then, until, so, because, for this reason, but, on the other hand, therefore, hence, also, inasmuch, the same as, as well as pronouns);

(e) purely logical (e.g. is, if-then, some, only, every, and, not, who, or).

Ingarden allocates most space to logical functors. In particular, he analyses the functions of the words: is, if, then, some, only, every, and, no.

The functor *is* tends to be used for:

“if/whether”), such that transform individual words into sentences (“!”), cf. one-word sentences like *Fire!* and logical ones (“.”, which separate sentential meanings).

Ingarden thinks that some functional words betray traces of meaning thus understood. These can be illustrated by factual function words, e.g. the word “beside” has material content that determines spatial location.

This conviction by Ingarden contradicts his position on the possibility of spelling out the subsequent moments of nominal meaning; cf. below, end 3.
(a) predicating, which is about generating a sort of asymmetry in a sentence: a difference between the function of subject and predicate; this can occur through:

— attributing some property to the correlate of the subject: this is so when *is* comes with an attributive predicate, such as in the sentence *This cat is black*; *is* would be here more or less equivalent to the phrase “has the property”;

— including the correlate of the subject to a certain class (of some property); this occurs when *is* comes with a nominal predicate: *The cat is a mammal*; here *is* equates *belongs to*;

— equating the correlates of the subject and the predicate, as in *Gerlach is the highest summit in the Carpathians*. *is* is equivalent to *is the same as*;

— pointing (in the definition) to the constitutive nature, i.e. the distinctness of the correlate; *This is a table: is* is equivalent to *has a name*;

(b) stating — i.e. acceptance of the existence: it is then an explicitly uttered moment of the existential thesis of the sentence; *is* is equivalent to *exists*;

(c) existential characterisation; it is then the same as the moment of the existential characterisation of an autonomous meaning.

These functions can also be modified by the presence of other functors in the linguistic context of the word *is*. Most commonly, the functor does not fulfil these tasks at the same time, and even when it performs several functions at the same time, Ingarden thinks these can be separated from one another. So, in an absolute affirmative sentence *is* performs the function of absolute predication (a) and stating without reservation (b). In an affirmative conditional sentence, in connection with the dependence of *is* on the functor *if* (in the antecedent) or on the functors *if*, *is* (in the antecedent) and *then* (in the consequent), the predication (a) and stating (b) are changed (become conditional), and there appears a function of existential characterising (c). Therefore a sentence *if p, then q* is not a usual combination of two absolute sentences “*p*” and “*q*”. In Polish language, in the interrogatory sentence where the functor *is* depends on the word *if/whether* and the question mark, it does predicate (a) but in a way that is altered in a yet a different manner than in the subordinate clause (non-assertive predication) while the stating (b) takes on a form of interrogation.
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

The functors *if* and *then* are bound to the conditional clause. The function of ‘*if*’ is:

(a) a change of the function of *is* from the antecedent; its suspension and failing short of stating it through;

(b) change of function of the absolute thesis of *is* from the antecedent into a permission of existence (of the correlate);

(c) introduction of a function of existential characterization into the *is* from the antecedent; functional (not nominal) solution that the state of affairs marked by the antecedent exists heteronomously or else dependently on the state of affairs expressed by the consequent;

(d) anticipation of something else — another state of affairs — than what is conveyed by the subordinate clause; this is why Ingarden regards a conditional sentence of the type If *p*, then *q* as illogical.

The functor *then*, closely tied to *if*:

(a) changes (alongside *if*) the predicative function of *is* from the consequent.

(b) changes the function of stating of *is* in the consequent; as a result of (a) and (b) there occurs a reckoning with predication and stating in the face of a possible occurrence of the state of affairs conveyed by the antecedent;

(c) changes (alongside *if*) the function of existential characterisation of the *is* from the main clause, by means of which the state of affairs conveyed by the consequence is taken for an existential (factual and not just mental) complementation of the state of affairs, conveyed by the antecedent;

(d) entails the occurrence of the state of affairs conveyed by the consequent, but without the definite stating, and thus in a modified manner.

The only function of the function word *some* (in an affirmative sentence of the type: *Some A are B*) is quantification, i.e. the establishment of the range of variability of the intentional directional indicator of the meaning of the subjectival name. Ingarden strongly emphasises that there is no moment of existential thesis here; it is implicitly included in the meaning of the subjectival name and propounded by the functor *are*. Therefore, *some* is not the same as *exist* in a proposition of the type “∀ *x*[A(*x*) ∧ B(*x*))”, which Ingarden reads “There exist such A-s that A is B(!).”

38 And which can be read: For some *x*...
The functor *only* in a sentence of the type *Only some* \( A \) *are* \( B \) implicitly indicates something more that the correlate conveyed in this sentence, namely: *an* \( A *that is not B*.

Like in the word *some*, also the functor *every* in the sentence of the type *Every* \( A \) *is* \( B \) is there only to quantify. Neither does it have a moment of existential position here.\(^{39}\)

Ingarden sees the function of *and* in:

(a) binding the names of different objects into a semantic unit of a higher order;
(b) generating an intentional adherence/possession of the objects of those names;
(c) forming a compound sentence.

The word *and* performing the function (a) and (b) would therefore be an internominal *and*; the one performing the function (c) — an intersentential\(^{40}\) *and*.

Finally, the functor *not* can:

(a) preclude the existence of the whole state of affairs, i.e. delete it from a domain of being (in sentences such as: *Not: A is B*);
(b) make an unqualified proposition of the so-called negative state of affairs, i.e. discontinue the connection of the subject of a property with a heteronomous property pertinent to it with regard to itself (*A is not B*).

### 2.5. Language as tool

According to Ingarden, language is a product of two coupled human activities: speaking and making sense of what has been uttered. It does impact on the structure of language formations. The dual source of language makes them the so-called two-faceted objects, that is — as Ingarden puts it — consisting

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\(^{39}\)This can clearly be seen in a formal interpretation of the sentence \( \forall [A(x) \rightarrow B(x)] \). Ingarden reads it *If something is A, then it is B* where the functor *every* is identified with a general quantifier \( \forall \).

\(^{40}\)Ingarden also mentions the distributive and additive *and*. 
of a sound and a semantic stratum (please note that the latter is a meaning only in the case of nouns, verbs and sentences).

The sound stratum (sound-type) is a carrier of meaning; meaning is what generates a purely intentional correlate of a language formation. Thanks to that language can be the main tool for communication. By hearing or reading, we perform actualisation; by speaking or writing, we evidence the actualisation of meaning. The actualization of meaning leads to generating an appropriate purely intentional object. One can say that a language formation has a capability of informing of the actualisation of meaning as well as a capacity of presenting the intentional correlate of an actualised intention. In fact, intention is representation.

The function of informing and the function of presenting are functions unique to language. Thanks to these they are the main tools of communication.

Not so about the two other functions of language that Ingarden talks about. These can be performed by any — not just linguistic — comportment of the user: influencing, i.e. having an impact on the addressee and arousing some behaviours (stimulating action, states of being moved, of desiring and volition) — as well as expressing, i.e. revealing the mental states of the sender, involuntary betrayal of emotionality. The latter is fulfilled mainly by means of a specific way of utterance.

Take Stanislaus again. By pointing to the Moon he says to Casmir: The Moon is linen. This sentence:

(a) presents, that is intentionally generates some state of affairs, that is, that the moon is made of linen;

(b) informs Casmir of the actualization of the meaning of the sentence The Moon is linen performed by Stanislaus, and it also stimulates Casmir to a similar actualization: co-thinking and co-imagining the intended state of affairs or, in other words, to the comprehension of the sentence uttered;

(c) influences Casmir, arousing interest, a state of expectation of what Stanislaus will say next or, conversely, an opposition, a desire to say that the Moon is not linen;

(d) expresses, i.e. reveals Stanislaus’s mental state, an inspiration (this could be a beginning of a poetic fantasy, improvised by Stanislaus).

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41 Please note that Ingarden’s expressing is something other than the expressing in the understanding of Kotarbiński; cf. T. Kotarbiński (1961: 13).
Notably, Ingarden strays from Husserl’s position and terms on the functions of language formations. Husserl maintains that what is expressed by language formations, can be:

(a) a presentation (in a more narrow sense), i.e. what Ingarden calls the actualization of derivative intention;

(b) an act founded on presentation (a), i.e. based on the latter and more specifically:
   — a sign act (e.g. comprehension of the language formation ‘gorge’);
   — an intuitive act (an image of a gorge);

(c) an act that is simply an intentional object of a presentation (a) (e.g. imaginary experience, being an object of self-perception).

Depending on what act a given language formation expresses, Husserl speaks of the functions of meaning (a), informing (b) in a more narrow and broader sense and naming (c). Ingarden claims that his function of expressing is identical with Husserlian informing. What Husserl calls expressing, though, should correspond to Ingarden’s presenting. However, if I grasped Husserl’s and Ingarden’s argumentation correctly, such an equation is wrong as Husserl’s and Ingarden’s divisions criss-cross.

Back to Ingarden’s views, language is not only a two-stratum formation but it is also a derivative product, i.e., a tool. Language actions — and those that generate names and sentences in particular (whose products are names and sentences, respectively) — are, as it were, immersed in other human activities. Depending on whether the original activity is cognition, creativity or action, there can be different objects of language communication.

Cognition, Ingarden says, can be done by way of a receptive indirect experience of what is encountered or by way of reasoning. In the first case we speak of perceptual cognition; in the other — mental cognition. Mental cognition can take the form of judging, defining, assuming, interrogating, etc. If we want to convey the result of cognition or the fact that this result is none, we associate the cognitive action with a language action. It ought to be borne in mind that although the results of the actions can be

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42 Judging as a way of perceiving states of affairs is, according to Ingarden, correlate of perceiving, i.e. cognising things and, perhaps properties and actions.
contained in different varieties of semantic units, some of those varieties are better suited for conveying some results than others. The final outcome of the different (original) cognitive actions and the related (derivative) language activities, will be — respectively — JUDGEMENT) (THE RESULT OF JUDGING), DEFINITION (THE OUTCOME OF DEFINING), HYPOTHESIS (THE RESULT OF ASSUMING) OR QUESTION (THE RESULT OF INTERROGATING).\(^{43}\)

Surely, such a subordination of language actions to cognitive activity cannot go unaffected in sentence — the transmitter of the result of cognition. There occurs a special change of meaning (and in particular: of the moment of existential thesis), enabling a transparency of its purely intentional object, a close fit to this object, to use a metaphor, with regard to reality.\(^{44}\) A sentence comes to claim the right to truthfulness (judgement), correctness (definition), probability (hypothesis), accuracy (question), etc.\(^{45}\)

Not so when language activity accompanies CREATIVITY, free interplay of imagination, actions meant to create an aesthetic experience, that is what it is supposed to convey the result of creative or reproductive activities. Then a sentence loses this moment of claim; hence it becomes a quasi-judgement; a definition — quasi-definition etc. Ultimately, these judgments, definitions, etc. approximate ordinary (pure) sentences then.\(^{46}\)

Other than the results of cognition and creation, language can be used in direct ACTION, that is, express one’s will through language. Such control activities can result in: NORMS — the effects of normative actions; ORDERS — products of the activity of commanding; WISHES — products of the activity of expressing desires, etc. Like in cognitive actions, the pure meaning of the sentence will undergo a change, as well: the sentence will begin to claim the right to justness (norm), legitimacy (order, wish), etc.

\(^{43}\)The product of perceiving could probably be called DENOMINATION (a reliable name), but Ingarden keeps silent on that one.

\(^{44}\)Associating language and cognitive activity causes not only changes in the artefacts of language activity. Ingarden thinks the cognitive activity itself can be susceptible to some pressure from language. The object of cognition can have a structure imposed on it, corresponding to the properties of the meaning of the expressions used (features marked by the material content of the name are emphasised in it). This was noted (but Ingarden thinks — exaggerated) by Immanuel Kant, too.

\(^{45}\)A name appearing as a denomination can be said to claim the right to fidelity. The word 'fidelity' also appears in Ingarden’s writings as a name of the relation of words to real correlates when these words appear in sentences that function as tools of cognition.

\(^{46}\)The degree of the approximation depends on the kind of genres: the biggest approximation will be the case in historical and biographical novels with the lowest in fiction par excellence.
The activities whose tools are language activities (particularly those that generate sentences), and thus mainly cognition, creation and action (control) are in themselves complex activities. Therefore posing the issue of the truthfulness of judgements, correctness of definitions and probability of hypotheses properly requires, according to Ingarden, that the complex original activities be investigated beforehand.

He devotes most space to the action of judging. To judge, according to Ingarden is to be involved in the following four interrelated partial activities:

(a) mental (intentional) **isolating** the correlate of judgement (intentional correlate and eventually an objective one), i.e. isolating the state of affairs, a relation of being, etc., from the environment in which they are involved;

(b) **predicating**, that is, sort of developing this state of affairs, existential connection, etc.;

(c) **stating**

(d) **absolutising**, i.e. apprehending the correlate of judgement as existing rather than contingent upon the existence of the subject and the activity of judging.\(^{47}\)

These partial actions or — to use Ingarden’s term — moments of the activity of judging, are conveyed by a sentence by means of nominal and verbal meanings as well as functors.\(^{48}\) They considerably differ depending on what kind of judging takes place. This is especially true about the moment of stating.

So, the categorical-asertoric judgement of the sort \(A \textit{is } B\) concerns \textit{states of affairs}, whereas stating contained implicitly in it (without explicating) is without reservation (absolute). It consists in an absolute acceptance of the objective occurrence of the state of affairs, i.e. absolute attribution to it of an existence, independent from the very judgement and the person making it. To be precise, this recognition obtains by way of:

\(^{47}\)It is hard to establish how different this absolutisation is to be, according to Ingarden (cf. below).

\(^{48}\)Cf., i.a., function of predicating and stating of the word of \textit{is}, mentioned above.
(a) transferring (or precluding, as in *It is not true that A is B*) of the state of affairs into a given\textsuperscript{49} existential domain;\textsuperscript{50}

(c) the co-called existential embedding of the state of affairs, i.e. taking it as factually existing in this existential domain;

(d) identifying these moments of material and formal structure of the content of the intentional correlate, independent from the cognitive actions, with the properties of the objective correlate.

Stating in the case of existential judgements, such as *A exists*, is different than in the categorical-asertoric judgement. It is still without reservation here, but it is not something only functionally marked, but it is clearly explicited by means of the word *exists*\textsuperscript{51}

Even more profound changes surface the moment conditional judgements of the type *If q, then p* are stated. In the first place, it is not really about states of affairs but, rather, connections between them, i.e. (factual) EXISTENTIAL CONNECTIONS, with stating itself as having a functional character (thanks to the words *if* and *then*). Functional stating of heteronomy or an existential dependence of state of affairs *p* in relation to state of affairs *q* occurs, i.e. as it were, entailing the existence of *Q* by *P*. An existential heteronomy or dependence, ascertained (functionally) by such a judgement, is a moment of a state of affairs, appointed by *P*,\textsuperscript{52} which is only conditionally stated (permitted, valid for existence). A conditional modification of stating, caused by the word *if*, is that the transfer of the state of affairs *P* into a given existential domain and the equation of the content of the intentional correlate of *p* with an objective correlate, is not linked to an ultimate existential embedding of the state of affairs in the domain indicated. Therefore, to Ingarden, the conditional judgement *If p, then q* ought to be distinguished

\textsuperscript{49}It is defined by the moment of existential characteristics of the meaning of subjectival name (A).

\textsuperscript{50}The directional indicator of the meaning of the subjectival name (A) is then directed straight onto an objective object (also-intentional); it penetrates, as it were, through the purely intentional object.

\textsuperscript{51}The predicate of an existential sentence is not really a verb but a word which only propounds the moment of the existential thesis of the meaning of a subjectival name (A).

\textsuperscript{52}Ingarden places emphasis on the existence of state of affairs *P*, heteronomous or dependent on the state *Q* is something pertinent to the state *P* as its own relevant (rather than attributed or random) moment.
from the judgement $P$ and therefore $Q$, where an embedding of such a state of affairs $P$ obtains.

Apparently, there is no moment of stating when defining, especially in a real definition. Only an ascertainment of identity takes place between two separate purely intentional correlates, behind which lies the same objective object.

As far as the activity of assuming is concerned, there does occur stating and absolutising, no ascertainment of anything factual occurs, though — something duly pertinent (it is no not ascertainment without reservation and without uncertainty as is in the case with the categorical-asertoric judgement); what is ascertained is something possible, with absolutisation less assertive.

The key component of the activity of interrogating, a component that corresponds to stating in the case of judgement, is a accepting the occurrence of an objective state of affairs, that is determined by the content of the question as uncertain. In Ingarden’s opinion, a question as a whole has only a purely intentional correlate. It is the so-called issue, that is, a state of affairs that contains a material or existential unknown, which calls for elimination.

Demanding an implementation of a certain state of affairs (e.g. Let $A$ exist), which alongside the so-called attestation of value (e.g. $A$ is good) constitutes the activity of issuing norms, is even more remote from an stating without reservation than accepting an objective occurrence of a state of affairs as uncertain in a question.

2.6. The problem of truthfulness

To Husserl, truthfulness is an adequacy of fulfilling a (void) sign act by an appropriate (full) intuitive act. Intuition is a complete fulfilment of a sign act if it occurs that a strict match of the two acts’ matter. A mere existence of an object is a sui generis objective correlate of truthfulness.\textsuperscript{53}

Ingarden holds truthfulness to be a property of the sentence that acts as judgement (result of cognition), a property that is relative to the objective correlate. The source of these property, which Ingarden calls a claim, is the function of stating, and to be more precise, the moment of the so-called existential embedding, present in it. If stating is accountable, the proposition claims truthfulness. Truthfulness is thus a property of a sentence, which it

\textsuperscript{53}A principle of medieval Aristotelians — ens et verum convertuntur — comes to mind.
is entitled to as a consequence of the relation holding between the sentence and the reality being independent of it. A sentence is true, when apart from an intentional correlate it also has an objective correlate, identical with the content of the purely intentional correlate. The truthfulness of a judgement corresponds to an occurrence in an existential domain (defined by the moment of stating) of a transcendent state of affairs, a relation of being, etc., determined by the meaning of the sentence: this occurrence satisfies, as it were, the sentences claim to truthfulness. This betrays affinity with Husserl.

Truthfulness thus understood is different (autonomous) from the verificability of judgement if we take a verifiable sentence to be one to which EVERYONE can subordinate some direct data. In Ingarden’s opinion, true judgements can be made of monosubjective objects, that is, cognitively unavailable to others, such as one’s own images.

Ingarden specifies the conditions, which make a claim to truthfulness of various kinds of judgements fulfilled.

The categorical-asertoric judgement is true if the state of affairs appointed by its meaning OCCURS irrespective of this judgement (artefact) and judging (action) in the domain where the judgement places it. In other words, when all the moments of content of the intentional correlate can be equated with some moments of the objective correlate.54 A categorical-asertoric judgement is spurious when the objective correlate does not obtain, and this is the case when the meaning of the judgement is plurisignant or internally contradictory. Then, the condition of truthfulness, indicated above, does not hold.

What has been said refers to positive judgements, such as A is B. Concerning judgements like A is not-B or A is not B, B is non-self-contained: it is only contemplated, purely intentional. Therefore, the so-called negative state of affairs, equivalent to negative judgements, is not completely self-contained (on account of the non-self-contained-being of B), even though, obviously, it needs not be a pure ens rationis (as A can be self-contained). This is the reason why it is difficult to determine the conditions of veracity of negative judgements and so they have, according to Ingarden, a lower

54In the event of an aesthetic value judgement (not just reporting-describing), the moments of content of the intentional correlate must become identical with the moments of the so-called aesthetic object, and with its value qualities in particular, i.e. values that are derivative and existentially heteronomous with regard to qualities aesthetically valuable, significant on account of the valuation accomplished in the judgement.
cognitive weight than positive judgements.

In turn, a conditional judgement is true if:

(a) the state of affair \( P \), independent on the judgement, with its content calls for heteronomy or an existential dependence on \( Q \) and

(b) calls for this heteronomy by nature and not just accidentally, with the

(c) \( Q \) capable of satisfying the need for supplementation.

This judgement is false if none of the conditions (a) to (c) holds.

The problem of truthfulness concerns, in the strict sense of the word, the domain of judgements only. Regarding questions, one cannot speak of a claim to truthfulness. A question can claim accuracy, though. Thus, it is accurate if:

(a) the contents of the intentional correlates connected with the meanings of the words (more precisely, names and verbs) of the question can be identified with some objective objects; then, says Ingarden, the meanings of the words defining the evident details of an issue are adequate;\(^{55}\)

(b) the meanings determining the known (details) of a problem only posit the existing states of affairs as what conditions a problem;

(c) the meanings of the words appointing the unknown are adequate to the range of parameters that can fulfil the various unknowns.

In the case of normalising claiming justness takes the place of claiming truthfulness. The product of this activity, the norm, is just when it is based on the truthfulness of judgements:

(a) on some values (we are not wrong in the assessment of the value of the implementation of which we demand in the norm);

(b) on the properties of objects that entail the value of these objects.

\(^{55}\)This adequacy of words would apparently correspond to the truthfulness of the sentence; see note 47.
In order to reconstruct Ingarden’s answer to a question, vital for cognition, on what language ought to be like to be a good communication tool, and in particular on cognitive results, i.e. on the very possibility of the veracity of judgements, we must again turn to Husserl. He puts forth the following set of categories:

(a) categories of consciousness (that is, the kinds of psychic experiences);
(b) semantic categories (that is, the kinds of meanings);
(c) grammatical categories (that is, the kinds of language formations);
(d) ontic categories (that is, the kinds of objects of psychic experiences).

For Husserl, the ideal of language (a logically adequate language) is one that clearly expresses all possible ontic categories, and so eventually all categories of consciousness. Language is not a mirror of reality but it should have semantic categories suitable for the expression of any possible ontic categories. Particular semantic categories can have a different inner structure than the ontic categories ascribed to them do, but mutual relations between semantic categories should lend themselves to reflect the relationships between the kinds of objects of experiences.

Ingarden, too, thinks language should have the same semantic categories so they could reflect the reality. Only on this condition will language be adequate and true. This is not to say that any kind of language formations (categories of grammar) were to have an objective correlate in the form of sensory qualities, and thus among the data of experience, understood as what is given directly and clearly. Most functional words are artefacts rid of an objective correlate in reality. Even so, they cannot be denied cognitive significance.

If the semantic categories of language have to match ontic categories, it is clear that somebody who presumes, let us say, that the reality is comprised of processes alone will deem the right language to be one consisting of verbal meanings, and thus nameless and eventually sentenceless.

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56 Some functors, such as is have correlates that are implicitly contained in experience. These correlates are only implicitly and are only functionally appointed. What is meant, e.g., is such moments of objective objects as form, state of affairs (?), existence. That they are only implicitly included in (experienced) reality and cannot be directly perceived does not mean that they falsify experience, as Kant would express it. According to Ingarden, these are pre-existing in experience.

57 See e.g. Bergson.
According to Ingarden, reality is formally very rich. It consists of things, activities, events, relations, properties and states of affairs. This wealth of reality must correspond with the richness of language, that is, a diversity of semantic categories that would facilitate a variety of syntactic connections. This is so in natural language. This language tends to have all it takes to be a convenient tool for the transmission of pre-linguistic experience. The particular formal structures (ontic categories) are appropriately rendered only by some specific semantic categories (things — by names rather than sentences; actions — by verbs rather than names; states of affairs — by unconditional sentences, etc.) True, all ontic categories can be expressed by names (i.e. nominalised) but this will be some falsification of reality. After Husserl, Ingarden emphasises that various grammatical categories (forms) can function as names (in the sense of a semantic category): noun (name of a thing), but also adjective (name of property) and even sentence (name of a state of affairs). But although an objective state of affairs: \( A \) is \( B \) can be expressed as the name “\( aBishA \)”, an appropriate expression of this state of affairs is the sentence \( A \) is \( B \). Likewise, the objective state of affairs \( P \) is existentially heteronomous (or dependent) relative to \( Q \) — can be expressed by means of an:

(a) existential sentence: *There is a connection of existential heteronomy (or dependence) of \( P \) relative to \( Q \)*;

(b) hypothetical sentence: *If \( p \), then \( q \).*

(c) categorical sentence: *\( P \) is existentially heteronomous (or dependent) relative to \( Q \)*

The range of what exists or what has been cognised is not constant. If the inherited semantic categories no longer yield themselves to a precise

\[58\] It tends to, as e.g. in Polish there is no suitable semantic category to reflect a relation which is not symmetrical. Indeed, if it is so that Stanislaus is wider than Casimir, then this one relation can in fact only be described only from one or the other side of the relation. So it is either Stanislaus who will be the subject of this relation \( \text{Stanislaus is wider than Casimir} \) or Casimir \( \text{(Casimir is more stupid than Stanislaus)} \). What Ingarden is after, though, is such a sentential construction in which both parts of the relation will be commensurate (they will be subjects). This is so when \( \text{Stanislaus is like Casimir} \). We can describe that by means of a sentence \( \text{Staislaus and Casimir are alike} \).

\[59\] In the end, Ingarden made this proposition less categorical: this can be another expression of reality, but not necessarily foreign to it.
rendition of our contemporary knowledge, adequate supplementations need to be supplied or new kinds of meanings ought to be introduced. The introduction of relevantly new semantic categories, and the different semantic units at large, cannot be done, in Ingarden’s opinion, by way of definitional determination of new meanings using the existing categories. It could only be so if new semantic categories served solely to name objects that are ordinary sets of parts already named. It would thus appear that the world is a set of simple qualities, and as a result of this assumption the so-called shape qualities would be rejected. It is possible to try to define really new language formations only when they have been introduced to the language and thus when they are already saturated with some sort of meaning. Ingarden leans towards a more extremist view. He believes that it is impossible to define any language formation if this is about defining its meaning. At best, a corresponding range can only be indicated — in the case of names and verbs.

3. Assessment

Descriptive psychology deals with experiences. It does not mean, however, that it restricts itself to a description of individual experiences. Contrary to the allegations by Husserl, descriptive psychology also orders individual experiences. Kinds of experiences are not, as would Husserl, discovered only in phenomenological speculation and descriptions. These are a result of the ordering of experiences, which takes place in the “ordinary” psychology. The novelty of Husserlian phenomenology is only about an attribution of some special, supra-real and constant existence, an ideal existence to these kinds, and, consequently, recognising the very activity of generalisation a special kind of perception: ideation. So experiences can be counted as special kinds, i.e. ordered, only when some properties of the ordered experiences (irrelevant for the principle of division that was adopted) will be be overlooked — generalizations need to be made for this purpose. So that ideation can be done, i.e. so that the Husserlian hypostasised kinds can be seen — and to Husserl it is supposed to be something completely different from imagining — the so-called phenomenological reduction needs to be performed.

The whole Husserlian phenomenology is in the end only a more or less consistently hypostasised descriptive psychology. This state of affairs probably did not stem from some opposition to some bias in the contemporary descriptive psychology, which lay at the foundations of Husserlian ideas. The considerable progress of psychology at the turn of the 19th century led to discipline being seen as a model and rationale for other sciences. Logical laws were taken down to the laws of thinking and experiencing. This was this
psychologism that Husserl so staunchly opposed. He was right to point that although the explanation of the laws of thinking allows an understanding of the laws of logic, and conversely, one cannot conclude that these are the same. Alas, in his fight against psychologism for its equating the laws of logic with the subjective psychological laws, Husserl granted the wrong sense to the objectivity of logic. He deemed the laws of logic to be objective, and thus exact, on account of their independence from man and experience. However, they are exact as they are CONVENTIONALLY set up, or with a certain understanding of the term — subjectively established. They are themselves autonomous from experience: but their ADOPTION — a contract — is independent of it. Logical laws must be established as strict for the same reasons for which a knife must be sharp, whereas a microscope — high-resolution. Only then will they be reliable tools of cognition and action.

Husserl efficiently fights extreme psychologism, which equates logical formations with individual experiences. His phenomenology is, however, not quite free from psychologism, if a conviction that one needs to seek a justification for logical laws in the laws of thinking can be seen as psychological. Husserl did not want to abandon this conviction in the end. However, in order to salvage the misapprehended objectivity of the laws of logic, he adopts the equally fallacious objectivity of the laws of thinking. This leads to a bizarre view that a detection of the regularity of the course of thinking, and all experiences at large, is not a description of something subjective, human, but, rather, something objective, which here means: independent from man, beyond man or supra-human; in brief, it is a description of ideas. This is what the whole Husserlian phenomenology is based on. The identity of meaning is supposed to be secured in it by the existence of experiences in specie rather than the similarity of HUMAN experiences. Pure grammar (description of semantic categories) is not supposed to be a generalisation of concrete grammars (description of grammatical categories of particular languages) but, rather, an a priori science.60 Maladjustment of language formations does not appear to originate from the inevitable vagueness of

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60In fact, this is not so either to Husserl nor to Ingarden. It is clear from the very course of their inquiry that for both German is the model of the a priori language of semantic categories. The prototype of nominal indicator is the definite article (the constant indicator) and the indefinite article (the variable indicator) whereas personal pronoun is the verbal indicator. The very idea of distinguishing between the many interrelated components of the meaning of a name originated in the obvious tendency of the German language towards compound words (single-word description). Stanisław Ossowski made a note of that; cf. Ossowski S. (1967) “Analiza pojęcia znaku.” In: Dzieła, vol. 4: O nauce: 48. Warsaw.
words, resulting from objects incapable of each being named with a separate word (possibly, there are no two identical objects), but from the unavoidable imperfection of reality, which is just an accidental shadow of hypostasised ideal possibilities.

This is not the right place to determine how much dehypostasised phenomenology is a adequate rendition of the structure and varieties of experiences to do with language. Whatever such an evaluation might be, one must admit that the notional distinctions introduced by Husserl testify to a great effort put into the ordering of psychological terminology and the elimination of misunderstandings resulting from the ambiguity of terms. Unfortunately, this is accompanied by the alternate application of too vague terms to signify the same objects. This involves the objects of inquiry so fundamental to Husserl as act, fulfilment, meaning etc. As a result, Husserl’s conception becomes too confusing.

In these terms, Ingarden’s works are a step forward. In the first place, Ingarden tries to develop the phenomenological theory of meaning and rejects Husserl’s conviction that meanings are ideal objects. The phenomenological theory of meaning thus loses its phenomenological character and becomes an “ordinary” psychology of language. But Ingarden inherits from Husserl his propensity for hypostasising and fails to call things the way they are. Twardowski described his tractates on the attitudes to language by its users as psychological studies from the borderline of psychology, grammar and logic. Ingarden is convinced that, in describing experiences to do with the use of language, he is pursuing logic.

There is no doubt that in perceiving (i.e. reading or writing) a language sign, one can learn about:

(a) the objects signified or described by this sign,

(b) the sender’s experiences:

— concerning the signified (described) objects, and thus about the cognition or representation of these objects,

— not directly pertaining to the signified (described) objects, but only accompanying cognition or representation.

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61Husserl tried the same in his later works, too.
Certainly, the same sender can generate (pronounce or write) a language sign, driven by a desire of notifying the addressee of either the signified (described) objects, their experiences or a will to influence the addressee in some way, such as to stimulate them into some action.\footnote{E.g. this enables the sender to mislead the addressee.}

The first of the relationships indicated above is, i.e. signifying (describing), that is, reference to reality — we accept the reality to be a system of objects with their many details — is, to my mind, part of research in logic. The laws established by logic are assumptions on which people establish themselves.

The second relationship, i.e. expressing, that is, the reference of language to its users (let us accept language to be the structure of language signs), is, to my mind, part of research in psychology. The laws established by psychology are the generalizations of what is to a large extent independent of users.

It needs to be borne in mind, though, that when we speak of signifying (describing) objects and expressing experiences, we express ourselves metaphorically. First, these are not only sounds or letters, but utterances (issuing of sounds) and writing, i.e. the making of inscriptions, TENDS TO BE a symptom of some psychic experiences. It is not the sound or inscription Moon or Moon is round that is an expression, i.a., of the presentation of Moon or thinking about it being round; it is the utterance or writing the word or sentence. It is only a shortcut and metaphor to speak of a mere sound or word as expressing. It is legitimate only in the sense that sound and inscription are PRODUCTS of speech and writing. Thus, as we face sound or inscription, we can ASSUME that it is a product of speaking or writing, those, in turn, being expressions of some experiences on the part of the speaker or writer.

Secondly, the sign itself is not a symbol. Therefore, let us be clear: The sign $A$ designates the object $a$ is a shortcut of the sentence: People designate the object $A$ with the sign $a$. Likewise, the sentence: The sign $A$ designates the same as the sign $B$ is a shortcut of the sentence: People designate the object $a$ with the sign $A$ and also with the sign $B$. Surely, the point is not to stop using these shortcuts: they do facilitate the use of language. But in order for them to do this indeed, it needs to be borne in mind that these shortcuts are SHORTCUTS only. Forgetting that is a cause of considerable confusion in linguistic research.

Ingarden lacks this constant awareness, even if he himself often postulates
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

it. This is apparently what accounts for his way in which he confronts language formations with any signs, both arbitrary (symbols) as well as causal (symptoms). It is both in the case of signs (as understood by Ingarden) and language formations, that only some “background” can make the occurrence (presence) of a sign or language formation evoke a certitude of the existence of what these refer to. This “background” is different for different kinds of signs: for a signpost it is a road; for a language sign — a complex of other linguistic signs (context), the user’s behaviour, appending a phrase I think to the statement, the unique place of occurrence (names of plants in a botanical garden) or marking the place where the sentence occurs with a note “research paper”, etc. What Ingarden says of signs in general, contrasting those with language formations, can only refer to the symptoms: they alone, and in themselves, testify to the existence of what they are symptoms of with their own existence.

Only such carelessness in using shortcut expressions can account for the way Ingarden describes the two-stratum structure of language formations. A language formation sounds and means, i.e. it has a sound and meaning. To describe a language formation is to describe its two strata, two OBJECTS: sound and meaning. Another step is anthropomorphisation of objectivised meaning. As was the case with stoics, meaning becomes potentiated intentional experience.

The following objects to be named of A:

(a) signification, i.e. the relationship of the sign A to the object a;

(b) signified object a;

(c) the relationship of the sign A to the sign B, which signifies the same object as the sign A;

(d) the sign B.

For Ingarden, “a language formation SIGNIFIES” i.e. “a language formation APPOINTS an object, but it also DETERMINES the objects properties, structures and a manner of existence, and also SETTLES whether the object exists at all”. It can clearly be seen that such an understanding of (autonomous)

63It is remarkable that Ingarden’s opposition to views of Polish logicians (logicians who were for the most part the disciples of Twardowski) is often rationalised emotionally, “ethically”. These views are supposedly inhuman, mechanistic, soulless, mechanical, etc.

Studia Semiotyczne — English Supplement, vol. V 41
language formations stems from Ingarden caring in the first place for the nomial meaning despite his declarations that the first and foremost semantic category was sentential meaning; only later did he expand the results of his inquiry into other language formations (sentences in particular). Likewise, the assumption of the existence of intentional objects originated from the pursuit of extending the expression “a name refers to an object” onto all linguistic formations, including empty names and sentences describing fictitious objects, spurious affirmative sentences, questions, commands, etc. This way a double correlate was bestowed on language formations referring to objective objects. The signification (a) is confused with the sign signifying the same object as the sign meaning of which is the subject of our inquiry (d), as is the act of presenting with the function of language, as a result of which there occurs a transfer of the properties of conjecture, an object-forming property, from the experiencing man to a language formation despite the reservation that what is meant here is the so-called derivative intentionality.

It might seem that if the signified A is a name, then *Somebody comprehends the signified A* is a shortcut of the sentence *Somebody knows that the sign A signifies the object a or the sentence Somebody knows that the sign A signifies the same as the signified B*, which in itself is a shortcut of *Somebody knows that people signify the object-signifier a with the signified A and also with the signified B*. Meanwhile, to Ingarden, comprehension is an undertaking, contemplating of meaning, only an actualisation, setting in motion a derivative of intention, previously bound up with a language sound (symbol). Husserl charged Twardowski with equating the contents of representation (i.e. with Ingarden’s understanding of a purely intentional object). Husserl, as does Ingarden, thinks that meaning is the very representation (intention), but (being exponents of antipsychologism) each of them in his own way forsakes understanding an intention as a concrete experience of a concrete human being. Husserl takes it to be an ideal presentation (species). Ingarden thinks that meaning is a potential representation (derivative intention). If meaning were to be an ideal object, an unchanging one, it would not be able either to arise or (remaining the same semantic entity) coalesce with other

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64 It is obvious that the comprehension of the sign A, which is the knowledge that the sign A signifies the object a assumes the possibility of perceiving or at least imagining the object a. Since we know that the sign A signifies the object a only when the object a can be perceived or at least represented.

65 To Ingarden, meaning, as a derivative intention, is a potential intention. As we remember, some contents of meaning can be actual, among which some can be implicit. A question can arise, what then can the actualisation of the actual but implicit moments of potential intention be about?
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

meanings into compound units (sentential meanings), which always leads to alterations in semantic structure.

Ingardenian description of the structure of meaning is essentially a sort of objectivised, de pragmatised description of experiences of a user of language.\textsuperscript{66} Also, the meaning thus hypostasised is on one occasion considered by Ingarden as a set of moments that generate the intentional correlate, and on other occasions as a product of a special intentional experience — a sense-forming activity. Meaning is then either a derivative intention or an originally intentional object, bound up with a language sound (symbol). So is the case with purely intentional states of affairs. These are the products of sentential meaning — and thus (derivatively) intentional objects — and in themselves, along with the correlates of the meanings of the adjacent sentences, intentionally appoint, i.e. present objects “in which” they obtain — they are then (derivatively) intent objects. This adds up to the problems with comprehending Ingarden’s argument.

Ingarden’s view of the structure of meaning (at least the nominal and verbal one) could be defended by equating some of the moments of derivative intention he lists with the functions of a language formation, namely with the signifying (the determined object) (1) and expressing (the degree of conviction of the presence of the object) (5), with others to be identified with the necessary components of the \textit{definiens} of the relevancy definition,\textsuperscript{67} i.e. listing only those properties of the object signified by \textit{definiendum}, from which all the remaining properties can be arrived at. This kind of definition would have to describe what Ingarden calls the material (2), formal (3) and existential (4) structure of the correlate of \textit{definiendum}. For the name \textit{(the) stone}, it would look: \textit{(The) stone is a real thing (3) of stone (2)}. It would therefore only be a clear explication of moments, more or less inherent in

\textsuperscript{66}This can be seen most clearly when Ingarden describes the meaning of proper name. The material content of the proper name apparently becomes saturated with qualitative terms, as a result of which this name is finally subordinated to the full individual constitutive nature, i.e. anything that is unique to the individual named. The same holds true for describing differences between the nominal and sentential manner of grasping the intentional correlate. Emergence of meaning, e.g. nominal meaning, has it initially restricting itself to the directional indicator; only later, along with experience (cognising the object), new moments of material contents appear, followed by formal contents, etc.

\textsuperscript{67}I do not discuss here the possibility of attributing to Ingarden a view that the components of meaning (the component intentions, i.e. moments) are simply all that which the user knows of the objective correlate of a given language formation, with the whole meaning being sort of a synopsis of the cognition of the object. A number of statements by Ingarden (cf. note 68) make this interpretation likely, too.
the name itself *(the) stone.* Remarkably, Ingarden does not investigate the meaning of adjectives separately but includes these into the meanings of names. All would indicate that these are heteronomous formations, serving the purpose of explication in the moments of material contents and existential characteristics of the meaning of name (the same role vis-à-vis verbal meaning would be played by adverbs). In the case of the phrase *(the) stone, of stone* would be identical with the moment (2), whereas *real* — with the moment (4). This is corroborated by Ingarden’s remark that adjectival names attribute one property only to the correlates. But the picture is blurred by what Ingarden says of materially, formally or existentially contradictory names. The first one would be exemplified by the name *wooden stone,* the second one — *stone being a property* — and the third — *ideal stone.* It might appear that since stone is a real thing of stone, then the phrase *wooden stone,* after being expanded into “*a real thing of stone (and) wood*” is internally contradictory because it attributes to a thing two mutually exclusive properties: stone and wooden quality. Ingarden sees the cause of contradiction in the directional indicator of an internally contradictory name does not collaborate in the same direction with the material content. It is unclear what this should mean if the material content, according to Ingarden’s (and Husserl’s) general position, is something directed.

A defence of Ingarden’s position, given the above interpretation, is made all the more difficult by a list of moments which Ingarden singles out in verbal meaning. One might expect that for the verb *petrify* the presumed definitional equivalent should be: a real *(4)* activity of acquiring properties *(3)* of stone quality *(2)* by something *(6).* Then a definitional equivalent of a sentence of the type *(The) resin petrifies* would be *The state of affairs*(3): a real *(4)* activity of acquiring properties *(3)* of stoniness *(2)* by resin *(6).* However, Ingarden does not mention the moment of existential characteristics with verbal meaning. Does the verb *cries* not preclude an ideal existence of the activity it refers to, as does the name *(the) stone,* if we do agree that ideal existence is existence at all?

For the aforementioned reasons, Ingarden’s conception in its totality cannot be upheld even if some of its passages are subjected to modifying reinterpretation.

List of Roman Ingarden’s Works Concerning Language

68In some languages, the functions of signifying (10) and expressing (5) would be inscribed in the name thanks to the article.

69In some languages a finite verb has an outright, clearly marked directional factor, by means of a personal pronoun (see note 62).
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language


   (a) Chapter IV “Warstwa językowych tworów brzmieniowych” [Stratum of language sound formations], 57-99.
   (b) Chapter V “Warstwa tworów znaczeniowych”, 99-247 [on semantic formations].
   (d) Chapter XIV “Miejsce dzieła literackiego w bycie” [The place of a literary work of art in being], 437-452.

5. (1933) “Formy obcowania z dziełem literackim.” Wiadomości Literackie X[7]: 3.


10. (1937) O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego. Lwów: 276. German translation:
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language

(1968) *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerk*, Tübingen, 440. Particularly:
(a) “Wstęp”, pp. 3-12 (pagination along the redaction of *Dziela filozoficzne*, cf. below item 1).
(b) Chapter I “Przeżycia wchodzące w skład poznawania dzieła literackiego”, 13-65 (as above).
(c) Chapter III “Uwagi o poznawaniu dzieła naukowego”, 105-116 (as above).


(a) §3 “Nauki pomocnicze poetyki” [The auxiliary sciences of poetics], 290-318 (pagination along the redaction of *Dziela filozoficzne*, cf. below item 1).

(a) 1. “«Prawdziwość» logiczna lub ogólniej poznawcza”, 396-397 (pagination along the redaction of *Dziela filozoficzne*, cf. below item 1).


(a) Chapter IX. §38. “Konstytutowna natura a własność przedmiotu indywidualnego” [The constitutive nature and property of individual object], vol. 1: 370-391
On Roman Ingarden’s Views of Language


22. (1958) “O formie i treści dzieła sztuki literackiej.” In: Studia z estetyki 2: 343-475. In particular:
(a) “Treść” dzieła jako ukonstytuowany w warstwie znaczeniowej «sens» dzieła i przyporządkowane jej pojęcia «formy» dzieła literackiego” [The «content» of a work of art as a «sense» of this work constituted in meaning stratum and the notion of «form» of a work of art assigned to this «content»], 412-421.


(a) Chapter II §18. “Zagadnienie poznania przedmiotów matematyki na gruncie psychofizjologicznej teorii poznania” [The problem of the cognition of mathematical objects within the psychophysiological theory of cognition], 170-194.


Some of the aforementioned treatises are also available in the edition of Roman Ingarden’s *Dziela filozoficzne*:


WORKS ON ROMAN INGARDEN’S VIEWS OF LANGUAGE


WORKS BY KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI USED IN THIS PAPER


2. (1898) *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, Lwów: 152.

The last two papers are also available in the collection: (1965) *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, Warsaw: **2**: 114-197, **3**: 217-240.

**Works by Edmund Husserl’s used in this paper**