The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture
Chapter 12
The Lvov-Warsaw School from a Bird’s Eye View

Jacek Jadacki

12.1 School

In order for a certain group of philosophers to deserve the name “school”, what is necessary and sufficient is proper self-identification, location, genealogy and ideology. The Lvov-Warsaw School (“the School”) fulfills these conditions.

Their members had and displayed the feeling of belonging to the community of the School, which provides an intentional link for the School. A singular characteristic of the School was the fact that the awareness of distinctness did not manifest itself in xenophobia towards other philosophical schools; transcendent polemics predominantly concerned specific issues rather than the style of (visionary) philosophizing and only concerned fundamental options in exceptional cases.

The period of operation of the School is believed to fall between November 15th 1895 (that is, since Twardowski came to Lvov) and at least September 1st 1939 (that is, until the breakout of World War 2); at least, since there are proponents of extending its existence to the following generations of continuators of Twardowski’s program. The centers of activity of the School were initially Lvov and Warsaw, which provides the School with a historical-geographical tie. Another characteristic

This article is a result of the project “The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture” supported by the Foundation for Polish Science. It is based mainly on the results presented in the book Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska [Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School], 1985, by J. Wołęński, in my monograph Semiotyka Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej. Główne pojęcia [Semiotics of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Main Notions], 1987, as well as many of our detailed works on the School.

J. Jadacki
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
e-mail: juliusz.jadacki@gmail.com

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
A. Brożek et al. (eds.), The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 21, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52869-4_12
of the School was its territorial (and demographic) expansionism: it covered the whole of Poland.

The School was created by Twardowski, and its representatives were his direct or indirect followers; this determined the existence of a genetic bond within the School. Another characteristic of the School was the great authority of the teacher without the element of domination: Twardowski influenced the views of his disciples, but most of all, he influenced their scientific, academic and social attitudes. Twardowski’s scientific ideal was reduced to three postulates: attention to clarity and precision of formulation, care of the formal and material value of argumentation as well as aiming to gradually eliminate pseudo-problems. Twardowski’s academic ideal was determined by two directives: of erudition and comradeship. What this meant was that every philosopher should not only practice a given philosophical discipline, but should also have general knowledge of all philosophical issues; his systematic knowledge should be supplemented with the knowledge of the history of philosophy (especially the most contemporary); and finally, he should have some education outside of the field of philosophy (especially in mathematics and physics). These very ambitious pedagogical objectives were combined by Twardowski (and his followers) with introducing his students as early as possible to peer cooperation in solving real scientific tasks. Significantly, he managed to achieve the majority of these objectives: the awareness of general philosophical issues, expertise in the history of philosophy, and competence in another field outside of the realm of philosophy became actual distinguishing features of the School. Twardowski’s social ideal was the conviction that a philosopher has an intellectual and moral mission and that it is necessary to treat a scientist’s obligations seriously (primarily the obligation to ignore everything but the truth in research), but it is also necessary to treat the obligations of a citizen seriously (first of all, the obligation of common defense in the face of the threat of any kind of servitude).

The representatives of the School, especially the most prominent ones, that is (besides the master): Łukasiewicz, Witwicki, Zawirski, Leśniewski, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski, Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbińska, Tarski, Dąmbska, Mehlberg and Kokoszyńska, are all connected with a substantive bond. This complex of common beliefs includes: minimalism, constructivism and (methodological) intuitionism, (psychological) intentionalism, rationalism and (epistemological) realism, (epistemological and ethical) absolutism, as well as (ethical) intellectualism. A characteristic of the School was the fact that these beliefs were not considered as dogmas by Twardowski’s disciples. They performed the function of probable (or even only convenient) hypotheses which could be (and sometimes were) discarded whenever sufficient justification of the action was found.
12.2 Logical Ideas

12.2.1 Formal Logic

The attitude of the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School who dealt with the problems of logic, predominantly from the Warsaw center, was determined by four principles: autonomization, mathematization, semantization and extensionalization. The slogan of logic for logic's sake, that is, logic without any metaphysical suppositions (especially logic which is not involved in the dispute over universalia), originated from the anti-psychologistic attitude of the whole school. The idea of using mathematical techniques was certainly accepted due to the close cooperation of the logicians with a strong group of Warsaw mathematicians. The idea of taking into consideration the intuitive sense of logical formulas was supposed to effectively prevent the dangers of symbolomania and pragmatophobia. The idea of removing intensional contexts was closely associated with the conviction (prevalent in the School) that the sense of logical formulas is ultimately determined by the sense of their elements.

Observing the mentioned rules was probably the main reason for the theoretical success for the Warsaw center.

This success was especially great within the area of the classic theory of sentences, which was soon deemed the “Polish specialty”. The School compiled numerous axiomatic calculi, predominantly full ones: implicative-negative (Łukasiewicz, Sobociński), alternative-negative (Łukasiewicz), conjunction-negative (Sobociński), 0(falsum)-implicative (Wajsberg), and disjunctive (Łukasiewicz); but also partial ones: implicative (Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Wajsberg), equivalent (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Wajsberg, Sobociński), and implicative-conjunctive (Sobociński); and finally, also expanded ones: with functor variables (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Sobociński), quantifiers (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski), and with implicative definitions (Lejewski). Apart from axiomatic calculi, a directival calculus was also constructed, that is, a system of natural deduction (Jaśkowski).

On the one hand, the classic theory of sentences was generalized to the form of protothetics: an absolute propositional calculus with quantifiers binding propositional and functor variables (but without funcators of name arguments) (Leśniewski, Wajsberg, Sobociński). On the other hand, non-classic theories of sentences were constructed. First of all, many-valued calculi were developed: three-valued, finitely-many-valued, and infinitely-(countably-)many-valued; first in matrix form (Łukasiewicz), and then also in axiomatic form (Wajsberg, Śłupecki). Further on, systems immersed in many-valued logic occurred: a basic (three-valued) system, and a complete (four-valued) system of modal calculus (Łukasiewicz), matrix systems (Jaśkowski), and axiomatic systems (Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Wajsberg, Jaśkowski) of intuitionistic calculus, as well as discursive calculus (which allows contradiction) (Jaśkowski).
Moreover, the School produced ontology (Leśniewski, Słupecki, Lejewski), that is, the theory of names with the primary functor “is”, an alternative to predicate calculus, as well as mereology (Leśniewski, Sobociński, Lejewski), that is, the theory of collective sets with the primary functor “is a part of”, as the basis of the reconstruction of mathematics, free from the antinomy of classes which are not their own elements, initially conceived as an alternative to the theory of sets (and ultimately deemed too weak to perform this role).

Finally, two logical notations emerged in the School: parenthesis-free symbolism (Łukasiewicz), and the original parenthesis symbolism (Leśniewski); the former is characterized by economy (greater than in the case of parenthesis symbolism) and intuitiveness (for very short and very long formulas), whereas the latter is characterized by ascribing a specifying function (categories) besides a punctuation function to parenthesis.

The members of the Warsaw center also undertook research in the field of the history of logic. They performed exegesis of traditional texts with the help of the logistical mechanism. This is how Aristotelian logic, and in particular: syllogistics, was reinterpreted (Łukasiewicz, Korcik, Słupecki), Chrysippus’ logic was reconstructed (Łukasiewicz), and scholastic logic was rehabilitated as a continuation of both the peripatetic and stoic traditions (Łukasiewicz, Salamucha).

On this background, a great synthesis of the history of logic (Bocheński) emerged after years.

### 12.2.2 Semiotics

An intentional and functionalist approach to language was developed in the Lvov-Warsaw School: language was considered to be a system of semantically transparent symbols and a tool of the inter-subjectivization of cognition. A reconstructionistic attitude was assumed towards natural language: it should undergo such improvement procedures that it fulfills the criteria of ideal language (Ajdukiewicz), or reist language (Kotarbiński). Reconstructionism usually went hand in hand with the preference of the pragmatic approach. Moreover, postulates of segmentization and categorization of language were put forward; of distinguishing language and meta-language (Leśniewski), as well as semantic categories: sentences, names and functors (Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz).

Regarding names, a realistic and neutralist doctrine was formulated. The former assumed only one semantic category of names, namely, names of things (Kotarbiński). The latter assumed that every name designates something: one object (individual names) or many (general names), an existing object (existential) or a non-existent one (fictional), and thus, it rejected empty names (Dąmbska).

Members of the School attempted to create a satisfactory theory of sense. In the idiogenetic concept, the meaning of a sentence was identified with establishing (or rejecting) the existence or non-existence of something (Twardowski), and in the pragmatic concept, it was identified with the uttering (meaning the content)
of someone’s direct or indirect thought (Kotarbiński); the meaning of a name was to be the content of an appropriate presentation. The directival concept assumed that the meaning of expressions of a given language is determined by the rules of sense in operation in this language, meaning precise language (i.e. compact and consistent), with guaranteed translatability into another language (coherent), if at least one expression in it had a translation in the other language (Ajdukiewicz). The syntactic concept was reduced to accepting meaning as a common property of synonymous expressions, that is, ones which are interchangeable in the appropriate contexts (Ajdukiewicz). According to the co-denotative concept, the meaning of an expression was determined as a function which establishes attribution between (final) syntactic positions of that expression and the denotations of the words which assume these positions (Ajdukiewicz). The rational concept noted the relationship between the content of an expression and the expression itself in meaning (Czeżowski), whereas the operationist concept reduced meaning to actions which provide a given expression with empirical applicability (Wundheiler, Poznański).

In terms of analyticity, the School was essentially in the relativistic position: analyticity is definable, but it requires relativization – to language (the rules of denoting) or experience (existential presuppositions). Yet, a generally acknowledged definition of analyticity was not developed. Analytical claims were defined as sentences based on nominal definitions (Łukasiewicz), true sentences in every semantic model (Tarski), sentences determined by axiomatic and deductive rules of sense (Ajdukiewicz, Mehlberg), sentences which have a postulate or a consequence of a semantic postulate (Ajdukiewicz), (essential) sentences which are consequences of logical claims and definitions of terms or sentences obtained from a propositional function by applying the rules of denoting (Kokoszyńska).

**12.2.3 Methodology**

The most characteristic feature for the Lvov-Warsaw School was its rationalistic idea of knowledge: only that deserves to be called “knowledge” which is intersubjectively controllable (Ajdukiewicz). Therefore, knowledge which is dependable and unprejudiced is reduced to scientific knowledge (Czeżowski). Rationalism interacted with a verificationist approach in the School: there are many methods of gaining knowledge, but what is decisive is how the gained knowledge is justified.

Regarding the justification of knowledge, a simultaneously realistic, holistic and hypothetical view was assumed. Most members of the School agreed that scientific knowledge refers to real models (Tarski), although the latter were variously interpreted, including from the point of view of phenomenology (Ajdukiewicz); whereas the instrumentalist point of view was relatively uncommon (Łukasiewicz). It was generally accepted at the School that the whole of scientific knowledge, or at least a large portion of it, is confronted with experiential data (Hosiasson). The common belief was that all knowledge is fundamentally uncertain, including scientific knowledge.
The structural concept of construction was usually tied to the logistic concept of the unity of science. Specific fields of science were therefore regarded as sets of sentences with a logical structure which could be unified: also empirical theories are susceptible to reconstruction with the meta-mathematical, meta-logical, and semantic mechanisms (Zawirski, Hosiasson, Mehlberg, Kokoszyńska). According to the cumulative model of the development of science, it was believed that it is heading towards constructing more and more general theories (Hosiasson), whereas according to the inferential model of making science, reasoning was recognized as the basic knowledge-creating activity. The views of the essence of reasoning were dominated by two concepts. Some were prone to a purely logical interpretation and regarded reasoning as searching for a logical reason for a given sequence or the sequence of a given reason in view of a specific objective (Łukasiewicz, Czeżowski). Others advocated for a more pragmatic interpretation and understood reasoning as proceeding from given premises to a conclusion (Twardowski, Kokoszyńska).

12.2.3.1 The Methodology of Deductive Theories

In META-MATHEMATICS, practiced mainly in the Warsaw center, predominantly effective methods were used, but the members of the School were no strangers to finitistic rigorism. If necessary, as in the case of the lemma on maximalization (Lindenbaum), infinitistic methods were also allowed. Mathematical research was focused on the theory of consequence. Firstly, the definitions of logical consequence (Ajdukiewicz) and of a deductive system (Tarski) were provided. Then the indicated intuitions were formalized in the form of the theory of systems, with the philosophically interesting definition of a logical theory as a class of consequences of an empty set (Tarski). Moreover, the axiomatic theory of a rejection consequence was compiled (Słupecki). In the case of the role of definitions in a deductive system the opinions were mixed: either they were accepted as theses of the system which enhance it with certain new semantic intuitions (Leśniewski) or they were denied the status of theses, which left them with the task of the non-creative reduction of certain terms of theories (Łukasiewicz).

A rigorous paradigm of formal perfection was in operation in META-LOGIC. Apart from non-contradiction, logical systems were required to be full and complete; axiomatics was required to be the simplest, the shortest possible, with the smallest possible number of equiform variables, and organic; a set of primary concepts was required to be independent and the smallest possible (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski). Another demand for axiomatics was for it to be categorically uniform and canonical, as well as to provide unambiguous terms (Leśniewski). The greatest effort was put in the Lvov-Warsaw School into the research of the meta-logical characteristic of the theory of sentences. Among the constructed proofs were: proofs of the non-contradiction of this theory in the method of a hereditary feature (Łukasiewicz), proofs of fullness in syntactic methods (Łukasiewicz, Wajsberg), proofs of non-contradiction and fullness in matrix methods (Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Lindenbaum), and proofs of the independence of axiomatics with the
help of many-valued matrices (Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Wajsberg). They also con-
ducted methodological research of protoethics (Słupecki), many-valued calculus
(Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Wajsberg, Słupecki, Sobociński), modal calculus (Wajsberg,
Sobociński) and intuitionistic calculus; within the latter, they formulated the claim
of separation (Wajsberg), constructed the topological interpretation of propositional
calculus (Tarski), and analyzed the relationship of intuitionistic calculus and the
classic theory of sentences (Łukasiewicz). They also examined the relationship
between ontology and the set theory (Słupecki) and some meta-logical properties
of mereology (Lejewski).

Within the issues of SEMANTICS, the most important one proved to be the con-
struction of a (materially and formally) adequate definition of truth for formalized
languages of a finite range which use the concept of fulfilling a propositional
function by a specific series of objects, as well as the definition of semantic
consequence (Tarski).

12.2.3.2 The Methodology of Empirical Theories

For the majority of the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School, an empirical theory
was an empirically motivated and inductively tested hypothetical-deductive system.
Induction was generally accepted as the basis, or at least as an admissible way
to justify scientific claims; the deductionistic standpoint, according to which
hypotheses and theories were deductively compared with reality, was more rare
(Łukasiewicz, Kokoszyńska).

The inductionistic attitude required the presentation of a satisfactory theory of
induction. Four concepts of it were presented. The inversion theory assumed that
induction consists in seeking the logical reason for certain perceptive sentences
(Łukasiewicz). The inferential concept assumed that inductive testing is not a kind
of reasoning, but rather a whole course of reasoning (Czeżowski). The distinguish-
ing feature of the decisive concept was the conviction that the necessary component
of testing is, apart from inductive reasoning, also the element of decision, alongside
the conviction that for a given way of reasoning to be rational the degree of certainty
of conclusions drawn from real premises should not be greater than the degree of the
reliability of this manner of reasoning (Ajdukiewicz, Kokoszyńska). According to
the confirmation concept, induction was treated as an exploratory activity performed
to increase the probability of a specific empirical hypothesis (Hosiasson).

Research on probability led to the observation that the probability of inductive
generalization is near zero for strictly general sentences; the research led as well as
to the construction of axiomatic calculus (Łukasiewicz); and finally, to removing the
paradox of confirmation (Hosiasson).

A lot of attention was paid to the analysis of the general concept of the verifi-
ability of sentences, both general (Zawirski, Czeżowski, Mehlberg, Kokoszyńska),
and individual (Zawirski, Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński); the conclusion flowing from
this analysis was questioning the radical version of both verifactionism and falsifi-
cationism.
Within the School, there were carried out precise analyses of such key concepts of natural science like the concept of law and the concept of chance (Kotarbińska).

12.2.3.3 The Methodology of the Humanities

The members of the Lvov-Warsaw School were fundamentally against naturalism: the subjects of the humanities are expressions of mental products; understanding these products is a specifically humanist way of direct justification (Twardowski, Czeżowski, Ajdukiewicz, Ossowski). Only a few of them reduced the research methods of the humanities to methods used in natural sciences (Kotarbiński). However, opinions were divided on the theoretical status of the theses of the humanities. In general, humanities were not denied the ability to justify the formulation of general laws (Kotarbiński, Ajdukiewicz, Ossowski), but clear nomothetic declarations were avoided. Some strongly advocated for idiographism (Czeżowski). There were also some who were prone to give at least some of the humanities the status of typological disciplines (Tatarkiewicz). However, there was universal agreement in the School as to the idea that the humanities cannot avoid abiding by general rigors of logical correctness. The program of the humanities without hypostases went the furthest in the direction (Kotarbiński).

12.2.3.4 Metaphilosophy

If scientism is the conviction that philosophy is a science rather than a worldview, that is, a set of non-scientific notions concerning the meaning of life and the meaning of existence, the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School were scientists. Science is, however, understood liberally here – as methodical, technically perfected gaining of knowledge.

Their moderate scientism was connected with the mereological concepts of philosophy as a conglomerate of disciplines. There were some who believed that individual philosophical disciplines are linked in that their subjects are given in inner experience (Twardowski), or that the only thing they have in common is the method, namely, empirical, as in any science (Ajdukiewicz, Żawirski), or a specific analytical method (Ajdukiewicz). Yet, there were also those who considered philosophy to be a conglomerate of heterogeneous disciplines, having neither the subject nor the method in common (Kotarbiński). Secondly, the differences concerned the issue of which of the disciplines within the conglomerate is the basic domain: epistemology, that is, a general critique of knowledge (Twardowski, Ajdukiewicz), or ontology, understood as a general theory of objects (Łukasiewicz, Żawirski, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski).

The scientific concept of philosophy was supplemented with anti-irrationalism and anti-maximalism. Anti-irrationalism was directed against practicing free speculation: presupposing specific metaphysical theses; as in all scientific knowledge, every thesis should be grounded in a way described in specific methodological rules.
Either exclusively deduction and induction which referred to narrowly interpreted empiricism (Łukasiewicz, Zawirski) was accepted or the concept of reasoning was broadened so that it encompassed certain kinds of analysis (Ajdukiewicz) and the concept of experience was broadened so that at least some kinds of induction found themselves within its scope (Czeżowski). Anti-maximalism was not merely minimalism in the School; it was simply the recommendation of caution in research. The assertion of philosophical theses should always be preceded with meticulous examination of the available justifications. It should not come as a surprise that (after examination) the conclusions would still have to be left open.

Following scientism and anti-irrationalism, the third indicator of meta-philosophy in the School was constructivism and linguisticism. Application of analytical methods was preferred in philosophy, especially logistical analysis. This is because formal logic was considered to be a general scientific model of a language and the manners of research. There were some who were even prone to treating theses of logic as alternative ontological hypotheses (Łukasiewicz), schemes of paraphrases (Ajdukiewicz), or directly, claims of science (Czeżowski). A lot of attention was paid to the research of language, as members of the School agreed that it is the means to providing the intersubjectivity of cognitive content. However, the School’s linguisticism was not radical linguisticism: language should be the object of interest to philosophy, but philosophy does not end with the analysis of language.

12.2.3.5 Analytical Methods

Generally speaking, philosophical analyses conducted in the Lvov-Warsaw School concerned either objects or concepts. Initially, descriptive analysis of objects (as representations of a given type), not entirely free from the risk of psychologism, prevailed; it was supposed to lead to necessary (obvious) general claims (Twardowski, Czeżowski). Later on, the semantic analysis of concepts prevailed, first in the form of the philosophical analysis of philosophical-logical texts (Łukasiewicz). The most common kinds of semantic analysis in the School proved to be explicative and formal (logistical) reconstruction. Explicative analysis consisted in determining a list of features which make a given concept, examining the relationships between those features (especially in terms of significance), and if necessary, replacing the initial concept with one which could be a scientific concept, that is, i.a., non-contradictory, acute, and (in the case of real concepts) consistent with reality (Łukasiewicz, Kotarbiński). This sort of analysis could be, and was, conducted in simple language which did not refer to logical terms in any significant degree. On the other hand, formal analysis aimed at specifying the initial semantic intuitions with the help of logistical mechanisms, in particular axiomatic-deductive (Łukasiewicz, Tarski).

An analytical method akin to reconstruction, but not identical with the latter, was the method of interpretative, translational and deductive paraphrasing used in the School. Interpretative analysis consisted in the ontologization of logic by
replacing individual variables of a given logical theory with names of respective ontological categories (Czeżowski). The essence of translational analysis was to translate philosophical problems to the language of logic (to be more precise, semantics); this objective (intersubjectivization of a text) was achieved by using appropriate semantic conventions or analyses to provide metaphysical theses (or more broadly: semantic intuitions) with isomorphic structure, together with chosen theses of logic and an appropriate reinterpretation of the consequences of thusly crafted theses (Ajdukiewicz). On the other hand, the point of departure of a reductive analysis was the assumption that at least some metaphysical theses (and more broadly: colloquial utterances) cannot be taken literally and should be translated into a language with minimal ontological involvement, e.g. reist language (Kotarbiński).

12.3 Metaphysical Ideas

12.3.1 Ontology

In line with the anti-maximalist attitude in the Lvov-Warsaw School, critical examination of argumentation presented by proponents of previously formulated metaphysical doctrines were considered to be more important than making expressly positive declarations, which were mostly treated as private, unofficial confessions of faith.

As for the controversy between realism and idealism, the argumentation of idealism was critically discussed through paraphrase. The result was negative. Transcendent realism is an error, since not every true sentence (in a given language) can be identified with a sentence assumed on the basis of transcendent norms, that is, axiomatic rules of sense (Ajdukiewicz). The error of subjective idealism lay in an unjustified conviction that by using (epistemological) language concerning only cognitive states (i.e. similar to the language of syntax), a philosopher will at some point arrive at a formulation of (ontological) claims about the object of cognition, which requires a language containing semantic terms. In particular, a sentence about the existence of bodies which are not perceived by anyone is not resolvable in the language of an idealist (Ajdukiewicz).

The controversies between pluralism and monism and between materialism and spiritualism were not analyzed in such great detail. Even though in the former case the School as a whole leaned towards realism, here opinions were evidently divided between pluralism (Twardowski, Borowski), and monism, as well as between materialism (Kotarbiński, Zawirski, Mehlberg) and spiritualism (Drewnowski, Bocheński, Salamucha). The most precise exposition was granted to materialist reist monism, i.e., the view according to which any object is a thing, that is, a physical entity (Kotarbiński, Leśniewski, Tarski). Moreover, an attempt was made to interpret empirically the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism (Mehlberg).
An equally polarized standpoint was the one pertaining to the dispute over universalia, where the declarations of individual members of the School were much firmer. Consequent nominalists, according to whom the universal quantifier does not have any existential sense (Leśniewski) and although certain specific expressions are equiform, expressions-types do not exist (Kotarbiński, Leśniewski), faced resistance in the form of the argument that the set of logical consequences of a given set of sentences cannot be limited to the actually formulated consequences, but instead, it must be accepted as a potential class (Tarski). Besides a certain version of conceptualism, which allowed the existence of individuals and classes of individuals (Tarski), the members supported radical realism, which grants existence also to ideal objects (Łukasiewicz).

In the question of determinism versus indeterminism, there was a general inclination to follow liberal determinism, and in this very spirit the analyses of causality (Łukasiewicz, Zawirski, Kotarbińska), and time (Ajdukiewicz, Zawirski, Mehlberg) were conducted. Support for the reductionist concept of causality was an exceptional occurrence (Borowski).

### 12.3.2 Epistemology

The controversy between empiricism and apriorism was critically examined in the Lvov-Warsaw School (Kokoszyńska). One of the reasons this came to pass was that it was from the School that the concept of radical conventionalism (which is a certain kind of apriorism) emerged, although empiricism was universally approved of and supported with research practice. This concept conditioned the view of the world, i.e., the set of accepted judgments, on the chosen conceptual mechanism, i.e., the set of meanings of expressions of (the appropriate) language in which these judgments have been uttered. In such an interpretation, there was no reason to grant a fundamentally different cognitive status to perceptive sentences and to interpretative hypotheses; this is how the road was paved for the idea that various views of the world may be true (Ajdukiewicz). In the end, radical conventionalism did not catch on, but neither did radical empiricism, which allowed only one kind of experience (namely, external) and which postulated imitationist reductionism, i.e. reducing all psychological utterances to sentences about appropriate imitations and auto-imitations (Kotarbiński).

In the controversy over presentationism and representationism, (ontological) resists felt obliged to recognize the idea that the direct objects of cognizance are things (Kotarbiński); however, most members of the School settled for accepting a general realistic hypothesis, that is, the view that objects of cognizance exist regardless of cognitive acts.

After thorough critique of the relativistic argumentation (Twardowski, Kokoszyńska), the School favored absolutism over relativism as a standpoint regarding truth. It was combined with the adoption of a classic definition of
truthfulness (Twardowski, Tarski). The operationistic definition was accepted only by way of exception (Poznański, Wundheiler).

12.4 Ethical Ideas

12.4.1 Meta-ethics

As expected, members of the Lvov-Warsaw School with scientistic and anti-naturalistic attitudes supported the cognitivist and intuitionistic concept of ethics. Scientific (theoretical) ethics is possible and necessary, and its task is to indicate and justify an ethical criterion, that is, the way to reconcile the interests of an individual and that individual’s society (Twardowski). The rules which provide ethical criteria are (reductively verifiable) hypothetical laws which constitute generalizations of evaluations (judgments on values), justified by referring to direct obviousness, considered as a kind of experience (Czeżowski) or a specific kind of cognition (Twardowski).

In terms of the ontological status of (ethical) values, the School as a whole advocated for objectivism and absolutism, although its members had varied views on whether values are specific simple properties (Tatarkiewicz) or perhaps modes of existence of objects (Czeżowski).

Fundamental meta-ethical syntheses came from the pen of representatives of the School (Ossowska).

12.4.2 Moralizing

The highest ethical value was ascribed in the Lvov-Warsaw School to the care of one’s dignity, courage, sense of duty and truthfulness, and as for others, they prescribed primarily the attitude of respect, righteousness and kindness. Some of the main ethical criteria in the School were: the autonomist rule of gallant (trustworthy) guardianship (Kotarbiński), and the egalitarian rule of equal measure, especially equal privileges (Czeżowski).

12.5 Reception

A reading of global philosophical literature indicates that the achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School, even within the analytical trend, were not adopted to the degree that it deserved. The results achieved in logic are the most renowned. None of the greater compendia omit the names of Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz,
and especially Tarski (as the author of the semantic theory of truth). Erudite references are devoted to Leśniewski’s systems (Goodman, Quine), Zawirski’s concept of quantum logic (Rescher) and Ajdukiewicz’s method of the elimination of intentional formulas (Martin). However, when it comes to extra-logical problems, the only issues which penetrated common knowledge are: Twardowski’s “philosophical grammar” (Schaar), Kotarbiński’s reism (Carnap), and the critique of idealism presented by Ajdukiewicz (Beth). Only the few foreigners who speak Polish (Betti, Luschei, Simons, Sinisi) are better informed.

Yet, there is no doubt that the Lvov-Warsaw School has had enormous influence over Polish philosophy (and culture in general). The measure of the lasting effect of its reception could be the fact that until now Kotarbiński’s *Elementy teorii poznania* (Elements of the Theory of Cognition) (1929), Ajdukiewicz’s *Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii* (Problems and Trends in Philosophy) (1949), and Tatarkiewicz’s *Historia filozofii* (History of Philosophy) (1931–1950) constitute essential and indispensable components of the philosophical culture in Poland. Despite all this, or perhaps because of this, the view on the School in Poland is not devoid of certain deforming stereotypes.

The main stereotypes are the myths of neo-positivism and of dualism.

Neo-positivism is the view which simultaneously assumes a verificationist concept of sense (meaningfulness is identified with empirical testability), the analytical concept of deductive concepts (the theses of mathematics and logic are analytical sentences), the physical concept of empirical theories (scientific claims should be uttered in observational terms), the naturalist concept of humanities (humanities do not have any specific methods of research), the reductionist concept of philosophy (philosophy is justifiable only as a logical analysis of the language of science), the nihilist concept of metaphysics (metaphysical questions are devoid of sense), and the emotive concept of ethics (evaluations and norms express only the irrational standpoint of the speaker). None of these concepts were accepted as a whole in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Empirical testifiability was considered to be the basis of acknowledging sentences (Ajdukiewicz); the intentional concept of sense was commonly accepted, and verificationism was at most similar to semantic reism, according to which those contexts which have a reist translation are meaningful (Kotarbiński). Analytical and synthetic elements were identified in all sentences, including the claims of deductive theories. On the other hand, a theory similar to physicalism could be found only in semantic reism, but it was not at all a commonly accepted doctrine in the School. The descriptive introspective psychology and the intuitionist concept of humanism were irreconcilable with naturalism. One of the tasks of philosophy was considered to be the analysis of language (including scientific language), but language was not the only object of analysis, and the analytical method itself was a means for examining factual problems. Not all metaphysical problems were deemed unreasonable, only badly posed ones. Finally, utterances belonging to ethics were ascribed a logical value (truthfulness or falsity). In this situation, considering the Lvov-Warsaw School as a Polish variant of neo-positivism is completely groundless. Even searching for genetic connections is not historically justified.
This case is similar to the alleged dualism of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The Warsaw center is not seen as a continuation and complement of the Lvov center, but quite the opposite, and the Warsaw members of the School are seen as anti-philosophers. A more thorough examination of their declarations, and most of all, the actual philosophical work, lets us conclude that their critical attitude towards philosophy was of a «terminological» or methodological character. Warsaw logicians were opposed to either using the very term “philosophy”, considering it not to be operative enough (Kotarbiński), or doing philosophy in a way which departed from the logical precision of the standard (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Tarski). This latter attitude fell right within the general tendency of the whole School to distinguish straightforward philosophy from thought poetry; a tendency which was often also expressed in the Lvov center (Twardowski, Ajdukiewicz).

The primary stereotypes, of neo-positivism and dualism, were accompanied with other myths: the stereotype of the School’s intellectual imperialism, the stereotype of Twardowski’s exclusively pedagogical merit, the stereotype of the completely peripheral value of Leśniewski’s solutions, the stereotype of the necessarily nominalist commitments of his ontology, the stereotype of the anachronistic character of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism, and finally, the stereotype of his ideas of semantic epistemology.