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KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE LVOV PERIOD

There are two groups of problems
which are always interesting to discuss:
the newest and the oldest ones.
The newest problems are compelling because
there has not been time yet to elaborate on them.
The same concerns the oldest ones; they are forgotten [9].

1. In their "Introduction" to Kazimierz Twardowski's *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, Johannes L. Brandl and Jan Woleński wrote:

Although we do not want to deny that Twardowski's early work – dating from the period between 1891 and 1894 – forms the most important part of his *opera*, we do think that in his works written after 1895 Twardowski put forward many ideas that go far beyond what he had achieved in his early writings. Not only are many of these ideas interesting on their own, they are also historically important because they influenced the vies of philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School [Twardowski 1999, pp. 8-9].

Brandl and Woleński mention five "ideas": the decisive argument against psychologism; the distinction – essential for humanities – between actions and products; the conclusive defense of absolutism in the theory of truth; the satisfactory separation of *a priori* and *a posteriori* sciences; the clear postulate of... the clarity of philosophical language.

We are more radical in our appreciation of Twardowski's scholarly output. While accepting the second part of the opinion cited above, we reject its first part. We are inclined to claim that Twardowski's scientific achievements in both of the indicated periods, the Vienna period and the Lvov

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period, are at a comparable (very high) level,¹ and – at the same time – the scope of his investigations in the second period is much broader and more profound than in the first period.

Accordingly, it is our intention that this volume – which we treat as a continuation of the volume edited by Brandt and Woleński – constitute an illustration of our appreciation of Twardowski's *opera*. (The volume is an illustration rather than a justification of our opinion because it contains only a selection of Twardowski's texts written after 1895.²)

We present here a short survey of the content of papers included in this volume in order to facilitate an acquaintance with the ideas Twardowski presented in them. (The numbers in brackets indicate the respective papers.) Texts collected in this volume are annotated either by Twardowski himself, by editors, or by translators. Authors of particular notes are indicated by the following symbols: 'Ch' – Alicja Chybińska, 'D' – Izydora Dąmbska, 'B&J' – Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki, 'J' – Ryszard Jadczyk, 'JJ' – Jacek Jadacki, Twardowski's notes, as well as authors' notes in their "Introduction" are without signature.

2. Twardowski had a very rigorous view with regard to the conditions that have to be fulfilled by philosophical research if its results are to be included into the body of scientific knowledge. However, he did not share the (positivist) view that since neither sensual nor mental phenomena are the object of metaphysics (or, broadly speaking, of philosophy), then metaphysics is not a science at all [1]. In fact, apart from the aforementioned phenomena, there are some objects of different kinds (e.g. relations) which i.a. metaphysics is concerned with. Metaphysics provides a description of these latter objects and makes use of inductive and deductive methods which are also used by representatives of the natural sciences.

Twardowski was a supporter of the cumulative conception of philosophy. A far-reaching aim of philosophy is to construct a scientific synthesis of a theory of all objects (not only of sensual and mental phenomena).

¹ A broad presentation of Twardowski's views in the Viennese period is included in the book [Brożek 2011], pp. 258-278. A critical reconstruction of Twardowski's main ideas is given in [Jadacki 2009], pp. 275-299.

² We have started to publish a complete collection of Twardowski's lesser known works. Two great volumes (in Polish) have just been prepared under the title *Mysł, mowa i czyn* [Thought, Speech and Action]: [Twardowski 2013] and [Twardowski 2014]. Only these volumes – together with the planned volumes containing Twardowski's *inedita* – give us a true picture of the value of his philosophical results. Furthermore, English speaking readers have at their disposal (apart from this volume and the volume [Twardowski 1999]) the following translations of Twardowski's texts: [Twardowski 1894], [Twardowski 1898], and [Twardowski 1909].

Such a synthesis has not been formulated so far; however, some elements are ready at this point and some have to be patiently gathered. For, according to Twardowski, "it is better not to have such a synthesis than to have a fallacious one" [1, p. 41].³

3. Unlike in many other sciences, the central method of widening philosophical knowledge is not conducting experiments but conducting discussions among specialists. Thus, Twardowski paid a lot of attention to providing philosophers with appropriate «laboratories» in which they could conduct discussions (scientific societies, seminars, conferences). "Appropriate" means here such «laboratories» that guarantee the fulfillment of the postulate of "the only dogma" acceptable in science, namely the dogma saying that "dogmatism is the greatest enemy of any scientific work" [2, p. 48].

At the same time, Twardowski was convinced that those who want to be the rightful members of philosophical discussions should be prepared for them. In particular, Twardowski formulated the following rules of «profound» preparatory studies of philosophy [4]:

(1) The study of philosophy should not be started from the study of its history, although historical studies should be connected with systematic ones.

(2) The study of the history of philosophy should be started by studying the works of classical philosophers and only afterwards should one study textbooks on the history of philosophy.

(3) The study of philosophy should begin with the study of its propaedeutics, i.e. logic (an aprioristic discipline) and psychology (an empirical one).

(4) The study of philosophy should be preceded by the study of mathematics, as well as at least one discipline from among the natural sciences and one discipline from among the humanities in order to acquaint oneself with the methods applied in different sciences [3].

Twardowski supports postulate (4) with three arguments: (a) other sciences deliver material for philosophical research; (b) some sciences play a role of auxiliary disciplines with respect to philosophy, (c) the practical knowledge of methodological correctness in other sciences facilitates methodologically correct philosophical research.

³ Twardowski's view on the criteria of choosing scientific hypotheses and theories is worth mentioning. His opinion was that from two hypotheses explaining the same domain of phenomena, one should choose the one which explains a greater subset of this domain, which is not falsified by any phenomenon and from which one may entail every phenomenon more easily [11].

Among the auxiliary disciplines of philosophy – in particular, the disciplines which make putting and resolving philosophical problems easier – there is, i.a., the history of philosophy.

4. One of the main philosophical issues, according to Twardowski, concerns the question of the immortality of the soul (*scil.* «self»), i.e. the question of whether the human soul, after the death of the body, “does not cease to exist but instead continues to exist forever” either as a certain conscious continuation of the soul previously joined with the body, or without such a consciousness [13]. Twardowski called the first kind of immortality “individual” and the second kind “personal.”

Spiritists resolved this question – positively, according to them – through the experimental method. Those who make use of the deductive method try to deduce the immortality of the soul from the conjunction of the following hypotheses concerning the essence of man: that a certain “desire for constant self-improvement” and “craving for justice” are essential to human nature and that neither this desire nor this craving may be fulfilled “in this world.”

Twardowski considered the inductive-deductive method as the most appropriate for this question. It starts from stating the fact of the sense of unity of our soul (*scil.* the sense of having only one soul) and its identity within the boundaries appointed by memory. This one and the same soul is interpreted variously. Some philosophers identify it with the subject of experiences, i.e. with a brain (materialists) or with a substantial spiritual «self» (spiritualists). Others interpret the soul as a string of experiences (we can call them “asubstantialists”), etc.

A consequence of materialism as well as asubstantialism, is the rejection of the thesis of the immortality of the soul; spiritualists, in any case, do not reject it.

According to Twardowski, the thesis of the existence of the soul as the subject of experiences is evident and, as such, it does not require a proof. An opponent of this thesis – an asubstantialist – could not use the pronoun “I” in its ordinary sense. Using a witty, imagined dialogue with a “group of mental phenomena” as an example, Twardowski demonstrates what curious consequence treating oneself as such a group leads to. Such a «group» would not be able, for example, to indicate the method of deciding whether a given experience belongs to it or not (since belonging of such a decision to this «group» would be equally problematic); thus, such a «group» could not say about itself that it knows anything.

After establishing that the soul exists, Twardowski tried to justify the idea that the soul is simple [14]. If the subjects of experiences had some parts and a certain two experiences (e.g. audible and visual sensations)

were located in two different parts, then these experiences could not be compared; however, such comparisons do in fact take place.

Having proved that the soul is simple (*scil.* that it is a psychical atom), Twardowski states that it is also eternal, since its supposed destruction could not be explained in a natural way. Thus, one should agree that the natural eternity of atoms-souls is accompanied by the fact that they are created by God (being created by an eternal God does not require the souls to come later in time and thus not be eternal) and at a certain moment (e.g. at the moment of a man's birth) they are revealed in the spatiotemporal world.

5. Considering psychology and logic as propaedeutics of philosophy and also after changing his position to an antipsychological one, Twardowski paid a lot of attention to the analysis of psychological and metapsychological problems, *scil.* investigations on the borders of psychology, epistemology and methodology. According to Twardowski, psychologism in logic – *scil.* the view that logic is a part of psychology or should be based on it – cannot be sustained because of the following reasons: (1) "logic emerged and developed independently from psychology" [10, p. 134]; (2) theses of psychology (which are generalizations of experiential data) are only probable; theses of logic are certain (and, as a consequence, undoubted), and thus they may not follow from psychological ones; (3) psychology is a theory of real acts of thinking, whereas logic is concerned with evaluation of typical products of thinking (thoughts) with respect to their truthfulness [10].

Twardowski considered psychology as an empirical science, *scil.* a science which justifies its theses on the basis of experiential data – as opposed to political history, for example, which must reconstruct (past) facts on the basis of direct experiential data, i.e. testimonies, and «natural» history which explores the history of some fragments of nature [5]. Psychology refers to external or sensual experience (*scil.* extraspection) and to inner experience (introspection); the latter plays the role of the final foundation of psychology.

According to Twardowski – psychology differs from the empirical sciences *sensu stricto* in the following points: (a) it is based on perception but does not make use of observation (*scil.* systematic and careful following), since psychical facts flow too fast and focusing attention on them annihilates or at least modifies them, we may experience these facts only if they transform into memory traces;⁴ (b) it limits itself to exploring facts

⁴ Thus, we are not able to observe our own experiences: focusing attention on a given experience annihilates it. All our experiences, including judgments, are accessible only by inner

which are known indirectly and, additionally, are only our own experiences; (c) it often refers to the investigation of only the external symptoms of experiences. The difference between psychology and the historical sciences *sensu stricto* consists in the fact that only psychology makes use of experimentation; this fact, to some degree, makes up for the impossibility of using the method of observation in psychology.

For these reasons, one may say that psychology is a quasi-historical science: it lies on the border of empirical and historical disciplines; some parts of psychology (e.g. investigation of psychical life of sane people) are more similar to the first ones, whereas other parts (e.g. psychiatry) are more like the latter ones.

6. Psychology owes its position of a propaedeutic discipline with reference to philosophy to the fact that it is a theory of thinking.

The word "thinking" has several meanings: (a) in the colloquial sense, it refers to all psychical states; (b) in the psychological sense, it refers to psychical states, excluding the perceptive and emotional-volitional spheres (i.e. the latter being the sphere of feelings and wishes) and it covers both concrete and abstract thinking or only abstract thinking which takes place with the use of speech [10, p. 137].

There are three groups of phenomena of thinking (in the psychological sense): presenting something to oneself, judging, and "pondering, hesitating, comparing, devising, synthetizing, distinguishing, etc." [10, p. 137]; the last group is "in constant relation" to the previous ones.

There are two structural contexts of the word "to think," i.e. "to think of *X*" and "to think that *p*," which proves the fact that presenting and judging are kinds of thinking. "Thinking of *X*" means simply presenting (imagining or perceiving) *X* by oneself. However, "to think that *p*" means to be convinced that *p*. Judging (being convinced that) consists in accepting or rejecting the existence of the object of judgment.⁵ Reasoning may be understood, according to Twardowski, as judging about judgments [8].

experience (becoming aware of them) which is, by the way, fallible. I may not be mistaken in becoming aware that I have a definite judgment; however, I may be mistaken in trying to know the properties of this judgment, through a reference to memory [11].

⁵ With Twardowski, one notices a characteristic hesitation which was also discovered by his students: could one assume possessing a logical value to be an essential property of judgments to define judgments without reference to the concept of truth or falsity? There is another possibility here. Yet, in one of Twardowski's texts [11], "judgment" refers to any mental action "which contains truth or falsity" [11, p. 169]. External criterion of truthfulness, understood in such a manner, is adequacy to reality, and of falsity – inadequacy with respect to it. The inner criterion is whether "true" and "false" are adjectives which determine

According to the traditional view, the principal parts of judgments are their content and material. (The basic part of a judgment is a result of the partition of a judgment itself, not a result of the partition of a part of a judgment.) Twardowski claims that this traditional view requires a certain revision.

Judgments are expressed by sentences. Whilst there is an assignation between sentences and judgments, it is not one-to-one. The simplest sentences are very short, such as "I am sad"; however, they should be distinguished from elliptical expressions, such as "Good" [11].

Twardowski's precise distinction between act, content (i.e. product of act, as he later made precise) and the object of presentation is commonly known and treated as one of his main achievements, ensuring his strong position in the history of European philosophy. Twardowski accepted this distinction throughout his scientific activity but it is worth emphasizing that he proposed some modifications in his initial conception. Let us report what Twardowski said about this distinction in the papers gathered in this volume.

Acts and contents of presentations are their metaphysical parts (*scil.* abstract ones). The language counterparts of presentations are names; the content of presentations corresponds to the connotation of names, and the object of presentation corresponds to what a name refers to [10].

The object of presentation is something different from the content of it, since (a) when we make a negative judgment, such as "*A*-having-the-property-*B* does not exist," then we reject the existence of the object *A*-having-the-property-*B*, given in presentation, which serves as a basis of the issued judgment; but at the same time we are aware that in the content of this presentation there is something (namely, *B*) meaning that the object of this presentation does not exist in reality; (b) there are different presentations of the same object (i.e. one may present to himself the same *A* as a *P* or as a *Q*); (c) the expression "presented object" is ambiguous: it may concern either (in a determining sense) a real object which is presented by somebody or (in a modifying sense) a presentation of this real object.

7. Presentations may be divided into images (*scil.* concrete, visual presentations, or perceptions) and concepts (*scil.* abstract, non-visual presentations) [10, 11].

Objects of visual presentations "are or could be the basis for perceiving, whether sensory or extrasensory" (i.e. inner); conceptual images are not visual. (Images of contradictory objects may be only conceptual.)

the sense of nouns near which they occur (and therefore are determining adjectives) or which change this sense (and are modifying adjectives).

Not-visual images are indirect images, i.e. a necessary condition for them is to eventually have a certain visual image called an “auxiliary”; the role of this auxiliary presentation is sometimes played by an image of a language expression referring to the imagined object [11].

Images are primary or derivative. Perceptive images belong to the first category, while reproductive and productive images belong to the second one [10]. The difference between primary and derivative images is not quantitative but qualitative. Perceptive images differ from derivative ones in the following respects: (a) perceptive images are connected to the feeling of the reality of the object perceived; (b) the existence of the object perceived is independent from our will; (c) perceptive images are much more vivid than derivative ones.

According to Twardowski, the question whether some elements of spiritual life may be the object of a reproductive (memory) image has not yet been resolved in a satisfactory manner; besides, those who answer this question in the positive confuse the reproductive image of a given feeling with a feeling which is in fact experience and which appears as a consequence of recalling some circumstances or persons. The ability to recall a physical object is varied – some people recall visual images with greater ease, whereas other people recall auditory or motor ones better. The question of the durability of memory (relative and irrelative forgetting) is not resolved, according to Twardowski. He was a supporter of the dispositional conception of memory, which states that “any perceptive image creates or enhances the disposition for an image similar to the primary image to occur; the former is called ‘reproductive image’” [10, p. 149].

Productive images always contain some reproductive elements (e.g. memory tracks of sensations) and reproductive images always contain some productive elements.

Twardowski gives the following examples of laws of thinking: (1) “Any our act of presentation and any our act of judging concerns an object (somebody or something)” [10, p. 137]. (2) “A necessary condition for issuing a judgment on an object by us is to present this object to ourselves” [10, p. 137]. (3) “If a number of psychical functions (e.g. images) are connected in the mind, a disposition emerges as a result of which functions similar to other functions occur when a function similar to one of these functions occurs” [10, p. 154] and, at the same time,

the issue is not similarity between associated images, as is assumed by defenders of a separate law of association of images based on similarity, but rather, it is about similarity between an image provided at present and an image provided previously as well as between an image suggested or reproduced by the present data and an image which occurred in the mind simultaneously with the previously provided image [10, p. 154].

The associational strength of images is a result of many factors. Twardowski mentions the following: the vividness of primitive images which are initial points of association; the number of contacts of associated images; the time interval between repeated contacts; the number of images associated at a given moment; the time interval between images associated in a sequence of subsequent images; the direction of the association (i.e. which image is associating and which one is associated); the type of sense on which associated images are based; the general state of the associating organism; practice in the reproduction of associated images; the emotional tint of associated images.

8. Twardowski considered the essence and source of mistakes in thinking to be one of the most important problems, on the border between psychology and logic [8]. "Nobody voluntarily makes mistakes for everybody has a desire for truth" [8, p. 92], so what does mistaken thinking consist of and where does it come from?

Sometimes one distinguishes false presentations and false judgments. In fact, one may have false images or concepts but fault appears only when one thinks that these false presentations are not false. Thus, mistakes appear only in judgments; mistakes in thinking are simply false judgments. Mistakes must also be distinguished from not knowing whether p (for any sentence ' p ').

Twardowski originally explicated the classical conception of truth, which states that truth consists in *sui generis* adequacy. In his approach, the relation of adequacy – in the case of true judgments – does not hold between the object of judgment and the supposed real object to which this judgment refers. This relation has to hold between the act of judging and its object. A judgment is true iff its act is adequate to its object, so: the positive judgment is true iff it accepts the existence of the existing object, and negative judgment is true iff it denies the existence of the existing object.

The source of mistakes of thinking, or false judgments, is in the fact that objects of judgments rarely "bear visible features of reality or unreality" [8, p. 96] (as for example the reality of some elementary ontic relations and the unreality of self-contradictory objects); usually, our presentations are imprecise and not exhaustive. Contrary to common expectations, making false judgments is not an issue of an act of will but of a drive; it is an inevitable effect of having certain presentations. This is why it is so difficult to refrain from making a false judgment.

Apart from mistakes caused by sensory illusions, one may divide mistakes into those grounded in: (a) memory; (b) an inclination to generalize (which leads to prejudices, common scientific views etc.) and to simplify (which leads to the conviction of simplicity of reality); (c) attention or

inattention concerning some elements of reality (which lead to improper emphasis on images); (d) in emotions or emotional «tendencies» (which lead to infatuation) and wishes (which lead to believing more readily in what is “beneficial for, or pleasant to, us,” [8, p. 115]); (e) speech – namely, its ambiguity and vagueness (which leads to verbal misunderstandings).

Twardowski proposed a detailed analysis of memory mistakes (*scil.* having their source in memory). They may concern, i.a., past time (here we have a hypothesis: “the time needed to imagine a given period of time influences this imagined time and its length” [8, p. 102]), the location of past events in time (here we have a hypothesis: “as far as a direct location is concerned, the vividness of a reproductive image is the most important factor” [8, p. 105]), and the presentation of a given object in a different way than it was presented in the perceptive image (here we have a hypothesis: deformations are caused by durability of associations), and forgetting (here we have a hypothesis: “the lack of a reproductive image has more or less the same meaning as the non-existence of a corresponding fact” [8, p. 108]).

9. Twardowski was a master of semantic analysis.

He paid a lot of attention to semantic analyses since he was convinced that the “univocality of terms is the most principal requirement of scientific language” [15, p. 215]: “in ideal scientific terminology, a separate name should correspond to each notion” [19, p. 293]. Ambiguity very often leads to paradoxes and confusion, even among scientists, because it is not always easily noticed.⁶

Twardowski was convinced that “making hypostases of abstract entities” [8, p. 98] is one of the most dangerous effects of ambiguity in the domain of philosophy. It occurs when one object has the same – but not identical! – properties as another object and thus one infers that some property is common to these things and that it has “a separate being.”⁷

However, Twardowski distinguished precision from purism, which he characterized as follows: “Linguistic purism is never strict and definite to such an extent that scientific language was unclear and ambiguous” [15, p. 215].

⁶ Twardowski presents the paradox of vacuum as an example: “The word ‘vacuum’ is ambiguous. In one meaning, it refers to the lack of space, and in the second meaning, it does not.” In the first case, one could perform the following reasoning: “Vacuum does not exist, for if there were vacuum between two sides of a container, there would be absolutely nothing between them. However, then one side would have to touch the other one” [8, p. 118].

⁷ Another source of hypostatizing abstracts is ambiguity of the word “is,” which occurs in many judgments. It may mean “identity, subordination, [or] inherence” [8, p. 117].

As examples of analyses of this kind, let us take, in turn: three metaphysical concepts ("part," "empirical," and "physical"), three epistemological-logical concepts ("truth," "independence of thought," and "prejudice") and three concepts used in ethics ("egoism," "pessimism," and "skepticism").

While presenting the analysis of judgments [11], Twardowski distinguishes different kinds of parts, namely: physical (mutually separable from each other and from the whole whose parts they constitute, capable to exist separately, e.g., the head as a part of the human body), metaphysical (or dependent, "which can be distinguished by thought in a given whole, which however cannot actually be divided from the whole" [11, p. 175]), and logical (or one-sidedly separable as, e.g., the concept of color with respect to the concept of blue).

Twardowski proposes [15] that we distinguish three concepts connected to experience: (a) the concept of being given, or the possibility of being given in experience (*scil.* experiencing), (b) the concept of making use of experience and (c) the concept of being an object, or the possibility of being an object of experiment. In order to refer to the concept (a), Twardowski proposes to use the term "experiential," to refer to the concept (b) – the term "empirical," and to the concept (c) – "experimental."

According to Twardowski, the concept "physical" has two groups of meanings [16]. The first group is composed of meanings which may be expressed as follows: (a) being used in research in physics; (b) being in close relation to research in the domain of physics; (c) belonging to the scope of research in physics. The following meanings belong to the second group: (d) concerning nature; (e) concerning bodies (or what is sensual); (f) concerning the human body. Twardowski proposes that we clearly distinguish "physical₁," signifying the first group of concepts, and "physical₂," referring to concepts of the second group.

10. The basis of the second (epistemological-logical) group of concepts is a pair: material-formal truth.

"Truthfulness" in the genuine epistemological sense refers only to judgments [12]. Such truths are called "material." In derivative epistemological senses, truthfulness refers i.a. to sayings, friends, etc. The term "truth" is also sometimes used in a non-psychological sense (e.g. "transcendental truth").

Formal (*scil.* logical) truth may be identified with a judgment stating the "logical relationship between other judgments, and therefore the relationship of reason to consequence" [12, p. 182]. As a consequence, formal truths are kinds of material truths, i.e. judgments "which claim that which exists or negate that which does not exist" [12, p. 181].

As far as the second concept is concerned, namely, the concept of independence of thought, Twardowski advised carefully distinguishing the freedom of convictions (*scil.* independence of thought) from the freedom of showing them in speech (*scil.* expression of thoughts) or in act (*scil.* acting in accordance with one's conviction) [7]. It is clear that the latter freedom is often violated. The freedom of (having such and such) convictions cannot be limited.

On the one hand, some people voluntarily resign from independence of thought, e.g. for the sake of convenience, or because of putting trust in convictions of a certain person or institution (e.g. the Church or a scientific institution). On the other hand, for some people, namely, for scientists independence of thought is a professional imperative.

Twardowski emphasized the fact that full independence of thought is impossible to acquire, since there is no area in which one may draw only from information gathered individually. We owe many of our basic convictions to our parents, teachers, educators, and, more generally, to our environment and traditions, and most of the time we are not aware of the dependence of our thinking on these factors. In a certain way, we are dependent on the language we use (see, for example, the tendency to reify designates of names which are nouns) and on emotions experienced by us.

Finally, prejudice is a conviction which is accepted in advance, unjustifiable and false. It often happens that the source of prejudice is a generalization of accidental associations: since once, or several times, the state of affairs S1 co-occurs with the state of affairs S2, then states of the type S1 and S2 will always co-occur. Superstitions and relics are particular kinds of prejudices. Superstition is a prejudice concerning supernatural factors and their influence on human life. A relic is a prejudice which has its source in an unjustified extension of a relationship of states of affairs which occurred in past – to the present.

Prejudices do not only occur in everyday life but also in science. The best way of overcoming prejudice is, as Twardowski puts it, fighting against its foundations: “ignorance and the lack of a critical mind” [6, p. 80] as well as “mechanical repetition and accepting what one hears” [6, p. 80].

11. The ethical concept of egoism is a crucial concept of psychological and ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism is the view that everyone's behavior is «necessarily» egoistic, *scil.* people always AIM at their own pleasure [20]. According to ethical hedonism, people SHOULD AIM at their own pleasure.

Psychological hedonism, according to Twardowski, has its foundation in “a double error: one of them is verbal and the other substantial” [20, p. 324].

A verbal mistake consists in an unjustified change of the usual sense of the word "egoism." In its usual sense, an "egoist" is a man who aims at his own pleasure at the cost of the displeasure of other people; hedonists, however, understand the word "egoist" simply as a "man that aims at his own pleasure." Not every action which is egoistic in the hedonist sense is egoistic in the usual sense of the word. Hedonists make a material mistake since it is simply not true that people behave egoistically in the sense of psychological hedonism: people do not take as aims of their acts only their own pleasure. One of the main reasons for the popularity of psychological hedonism is, on the one hand, the commonness of egoistic attitudes, and, on the other hand, confusing pleasure as a phenomenon that accompanies some human actions with pleasure as the conscious aim of these actions.

The second term used by ethicists, namely, the term "pessimism," has two different but related senses: a practical one and a theoretical one. It is the same with the term "optimism" [21].

A theoretical pessimist claims that there is more evil than good in the world. A theoretical optimist claims that there is more good than evil in the world. A practical pessimist is inclined to see evil rather than good in other people, whereas a practical optimist is inclined to see good rather than evil in other people.

The controversy between theoretical pessimists and optimists is irresolvable according to Twardowski. In order to resolve such a problem, it would be necessary to know what people experience more frequently and with greater intensity: good or evil. This, however, cannot be known.

The positions of a practical pessimist and optimist are based on their dispositions and personal experiences, which are different in the case of different people. A reasonable man should be aware of it and beware of unjustified generalizations.

The third concept often used by ethicists is the concept of (ethical) skepticism. The analysis of this concept is based on noticing that there are general and particular skepticisms [18].

A general skepticism in its radical version claims that nobody is able to know anything. Such a view is self-contradictory, since proclaiming this view would be a certificate of having a certain knowledge, which would be in contradiction to the content of this view.

General skepticism in its moderate version (*scil.* relativism) claims that nobody is able to acquire absolute knowledge: every true judgment is true "AS REGARDS these or those conditions" [18, p. 239]. A kind of relativism is subjectivism stating that "the truthfulness or falsity of a judgment depends on the subject who makes the judgment" [18, p. 239]. Relativism and subjectivism – especially in the domain of axiology – is sometimes

caused by becoming aware (e.g. as a consequence of traveling) that in different parts of the Earth, people represent different states of knowledge.

Particular skepticisms (special, limited ones) claim that nobody may know anything in the definite domain of reality, or that nobody can gain any knowledge through this or that source of cognition. Here is where positivism (i.e. skepticism concerning everything that is not based on empirical data), religious skepticism and ethical skepticism belong.

12. Twardowski was convinced that scientific methods may be applied in ethics and, more broadly, in axiology as a whole, just like in metaphysics. He focused on justifying this thesis.

As Twardowski states, the question of the possibility of scientific ethics is connected with the question of whether ethical skepticism is justified. That is why Twardowski provided an in-depth analysis of this kind of skepticism [18].

Ethical skepticism is a variant concerning the possibility of constructing scientific normative ethics, i.e. ethics whose core is the thesis that "there are vital values and we are able to make statements about them in a scientific way" [18, p. 242], like "*A* has a positive (resp. negative) moral value" [18, p. 242]. In the theoretical version, it states that such values do not exist (*scil.* ethical nihilism), or at least nobody is able to know the objective difference between good and evil (*scil.* ethical agnosticism); in the practical version, it states that a possible knowledge of the difference between good and evil does not influence our behavior (*scil.* ethical pessimism).

The role of the foundation of ethical agnosticism is played by alethic relativism. Ethical relativism is the result of confusing sayings (which are often elliptic) with judgments; only the latter have a definite logical value. The subjectivist version of relativism leads either to *regressus ad infinitum* or to an inner contradiction; subjectivism is caused by confusing "judgments on real things [...] with judgments on presentations of things" [18, p. 250].

13. Alethic absolutism is connected to the problem of determinism [18].

Is it not the case that "every object of a rightly made affirmative judgment has an objective value in the present, in the past, in the future" [18, p. 251] resolves the controversy determinism-indeterminism for determinism? Kotarbiński claimed that it is the case, whereas Leśniewski was of the opposite opinion.

According to Twardowski – Kotarbiński's conception is mistaken and the source of his mistake lies in "confusing two things: on the one hand, the possibility of judging in the present whether [given] judgments are true or false with, on the other hand, the actual truthfulness or falsity of

the judgments" [18, p. 254]. Kotarbiński *de facto* combines "truthfulness of a judgment which states the existence of a future event" [18, p. 239] with the "necessity of this future event." Let ' T ' designate the present. Let ' S_p ' designate some future event. Let ' S ' designate a judgment stating the occurrence of S_p . We thus have either:

(1) S_p has to (*scil.* it may not not) occur $\Rightarrow Z$ is true in T .

or:

(2) Z is true in $T \Rightarrow S_p$ has to occur.

Twardowski is convinced that instead of (1) and (2) one may say, respectively, that:

(3) S_p will occur $\Rightarrow Z$ is true at T

(4) Z is true at $T \Rightarrow S_p$ will occur.

The formula (3) states the dependence between truthfulness of judgment from the occurrence of the corresponding state of affairs, whereas the formula (4) – concerns the dependence of the occurrence of the state of affairs from truthfulness of corresponding judgment. In this second case, it is not a causal but logical determination: the truthfulness (in T) of judgment Z entails the truthfulness of the judgment that S_p will occur.

Since alethic relativism loses its own foundation, it may not serve as the foundation of ethical agnosticism.

14. Other arguments are also issued as justification of agnosticisms. It is stated that: (a) there are no ethical norms (resp. criterions) which are absolutely valid; (b) there are no norms which are commonly (i.e. always and in all societies) valid; (c) the terms "good" and "evil" have different meanings in different times and places [18].

These arguments have to be refuted, because: (a) norms which are treated as general judgments are in fact limited to a certain determined domain; (b) the fact that some norms are not valid in some periods and in some societies may be interpreted in a twofold manner: firstly, it may mean that these norms are not (in these periods or societies) accepted as valid, however, it happens that people are mistaken by accepting a given norm as valid; secondly, it may mean that these norms are formulated as general but in fact they are not generally applicable; (c) a change of concepts does not entail a change of norms.

15. Ethical skepticism may also be analyzed from the point of view of whether there are any criteria of good and evil [18]. There are the following possibilities here:

- (1) we have both definitions and the criterion of good and evil (dogmatism₁);
- (2) we have definitions but we do not have the criterion of good and evil (dogmatism₂);
- (3) we do not have definitions but we have the criterion of good and evil (dogmatism₃);
- (4) we have neither definitions nor the criterion of good and evil (theoretical skepticism);
- (5) we can only «define» good and evil intuitively (extreme intuitionism).

If one accepts combination (4), then one may claim that the terms “good” and “evil” cannot be theoretical terms and that they have to be exchanged with one of remaining combinations (e.g. by terms “ordered” and “prohibited”); however, such a resolution also raises theoretical difficulties (cf. ordered or prohibited by whom?).

The aforementioned ethical pessimism has two foundations: hedonism and determinism. According to ethical hedonism, “there should always be egoistic incentives behind [human ethical] [...] actions” [18, p. 264]. Psychological hedonism serves as a justification of this hedonism. The former claims that people are always motivated by egoistic factors. According to Twardowski, if psychological hedonism were true, the formulation of any ethical norms, including norms of ethical hedonism, would be useless. Maybe egoistic acts are frequent, but generalization of ethical hedonism is a false thesis. Such a generalization appears to be true only because its supporters understand the term “egoism” improperly. To be an egoist, it does not suffice to be a man who looks everywhere for his own pleasure (as hedonists claim); one has to, moreover, do so although his “own pleasure or distress is connected to someone else’s pleasure or distress” [20, p. 324].

On the other hand, even in this understanding of hedonism (probably “ipsism” is a better term for this phenomenon), psychological hedonism is false, since some acts cause pleasure to their actors but this pleasure is not the incentive to undertake these acts. Moreover, it happens that the actor takes pleasure in causing pleasure for other people.

16. The other factor which connects the problem of ethical skepticism with determinism is the question of the freedom of will [18].

Twardowski emphasizes that it is not a case of physical freedom which consists in the fact that:

$$(X \text{ decided to do } C \wedge \text{there are no external obstacles to do } C) \Rightarrow \\ \Rightarrow X \text{ will do } C).$$

The question of freedom of will is connected to determinism, since X 's freedom of will is defined as the lack of causes of X 's acts or resolutions. Both motives and X 's character (*scil.* a set of his dispositions) may play the role of such causes. It is not Twardowski's aim to resolve the controversy between determinism and indeterminism but to decide whether "determinism actually poses such a danger to ethics as it is claimed" [18, p. 271].

Twardowski's answer is negative, since if resolutions really have causes-motives and are influenced by the character of the actor,⁸ then nothing stands in the way of evaluating acts ethically with respect to these motives and this character. Generally, "even if some phenomenon is necessary, it never poses any difficulties to evaluate it" [18, p. 272]. However, the question arises whether X is responsible for X 's acts, undertaken as a consequence of X 's decision determined by motives and X 's character. According to Twardowski, if a given act is undertaken in such circumstances, i.e. may be ascribed to X or X is an actor of it, then X is responsible for this act against Y (if Y has the right to atonement): this act is his merit (if it is good) or guilt (if it is evil), so it deserves reward or punishment, respectively. The question of the existence of pleasure (resp. displeasure) connected with responsibility for good acts (resp. evil ones) is neutral for the determinism-indeterminism controversy. This is because, despite the fact that they have a "source" in past decisions, then their *raison d'être* lies in future decisions, "experienced after the first resolution leave a mark on the human soul," which sometimes changes his dispositions. The problem is not that we WILL ABLE TO ACT in such and such a way because of them but that we WILL REALLY ACT so and so. On this approach, pleasure and displeasure (*scil.* inner determinacy) have an educational function.

Twardowski claimed that despite the fact that the EXISTENCE of free will is not necessary for moral improvement, some people need to BELIEVE (at least instinctively) IN THE EXISTENCE of free will.

However, if determinism is a true thesis, then the reason for the existence of practical ethics (*eo ipso* formulating ethical norms) could be that some person "cares about the positive value of resolutions."

It is sometimes claimed that one may not construct such a system of moral norms which would enable us to evaluate every act falling under an ethical criterion. Twardowski was convinced that such a view may be effectively falsified simply by constructing such a system.

⁸ According to Twardowski, the total cause is composed of necessary conditions and the final cause. Together, they are sufficient for the occurrence of the effect [19].

17. Twardowski was interested in the question of whether “the problem of the freedom of will is resolved matters for ethics and criminal law,” as it surely happens in the case of religion (without the assumption of free will one would have to accept the dogma of predestination in the area of salvation) [19].

According to Twardowski, the question of free will is resolved in the negative; determinism is the most probable of all possible standpoints. Moreover, determinism may be reconciled with the main assumptions of ethics and criminal law more easily than indeterminism.

The details read as follows.

When we speak of freedom of will, the word “will” does not refer to the ability to have feelings and desires or to make decisions (nor to any of these abilities) but directly to these acts, to the acts of resolutions in particular.

Further, the will (resolution) may be free in a double sense:

(a) in the physical (colloquial) sense, it is understood as “FREEDOM FROM OBSTACLES IN EXECUTING RESOLUTIONS,” i.e. when a resolved action does not encounter external obstacles;

(b) in the philosophical (metaphysical) sense, it is understood as the fact that resolutions are not determined by character (considered as the totality of dispositions) and intellectual or motional motives (which activate dispositions).

The existence of physical freedom (a) is a fact, although this freedom is limited to some degree.

However, we do not have philosophical freedom (b), since in order to make a resolution, the occurrence of some motives is necessary and, moreover, the following mental phenomena have to appear: a presentation of the object of resolution, lack of conviction of irrealizability of this object, and desire to realize it. One may often resolve to do this or that – but not always: it is possible only if appropriate circumstances occur. That is why remorse concerns not a certain resolution as such but motives and character which are the source of this resolution. According to Twardowski, a decisive argument for determinism in the area of acts of will is the fact that there are situations in which we can accurately indicate motives and dispositions which caused such and such a resolution on the part of a given person (if we only know enough about this person).

By the way, Twardowski shows that the so-called paradox of Buridan’s ass – showing the impossibility of making a resolution about which out of two identical bundles of hay is to be eaten – is only theoretical fiction, neutral from the point of view of the determinism-indeterminism controversy. In reality, all asses make such a resolution in the end: according

to determinists, they are inclined by given dispositions or motives, and according to indeterminists – by free acts of will.

Indeterminists claim that taking a deterministic standpoint makes the application of the concept of the so-called ascribing possible in ethics and criminal law. To ascribe the act *C* to resolution of *X* – and, as a consequence, to consider the act *C* as a merit or guilt of *X*, means to make a judgment that *X* is the actor of *C*, i.e. that *C* results from character of *X*. According to Twardowski, “ascribing” thus understood may be predicate to the acting man also on the grounds of determinism.

18. Among the reasons for ethical relativism, one could mention the ethical consequences of the theory of evolution for ethics. Twardowski, while not saying anything about the theory of evolution itself, nevertheless carefully analyzed these supposed consequences [17].

In connection with the widely diffused theory of evolution, there appeared a conception stating that “ethical convictions result from sexual selection and other evolutionary factors, as particular animal classifications do.” One started to consider every act which “conduces toward sustaining the life of an individual or the whole of mankind and at the same time does not allow these interests of particular individuals to become contentious” as a moral act. It leads to a change in ethical convictions accompanying changes in living conditions and, as a consequence, to “ethical anarchy.”

As Twardowski emphasizes, it is irrational not to accept the fact that people differ in their ethical (made on the basis of conscience), aesthetic (made on the basis of taste), and logical evaluations, *scil.* those of convictions with respect to logical value (made on the basis of reason). However, it does not entail that there are no commonly valid evaluations in the domain of conscience, taste and reason. Differences in opinions may have their source in the fact that we do not have a theory ordering these issues.

Supporters of evolutionary ethics justify their standpoint by the claim that there is no *analogue* of logical axioms in the domain of ethics, i.e. that there are no ethical axioms that are obvious for everyone in the way logical dogmas are (e.g. that a part is smaller than the whole). Twardowski did not accept this argument, drawing attention to the fact that if a logical dogma is to be obvious for a given person, it has to be fully understandable to this person. The same concerns ethical dogmas. That is why there is a need for the education of not only reason but also conscience. The second type of education is even more difficult, since the ethical development of an individual is overtaken by intellectual development and thus “there are more wise people than moral ones” [17, p. 233].

In the end, as Twardowski says, there are no “moral truths” that develop in the course of evolution but “people develop in respect of reason and

conscience and aesthetic taste and as a consequence, they get rid of more and more mistakes" [17, p. 235].

19. Among the particular ethical problems analyzed by Twardowski, there is, i.a., the question whether the norm "Do not lie!" is absolute. He declared as his standpoint that "an absolute prohibition of lying is untenable" [22, p. 334].

Lying is acceptable, i.a., in the following circumstances: (a) person *A* lies to person *B*, where *B* is a child or a mentally handicapped person; (b) person *C* misunderstands what person *A* says to person *B*, but *A* intentionally speaks in such a way that *C* is not able to establish *A*'s real intentions; (c) person *A* lies to person *B* not to the detriment of *B* but does person *B* a favor; (d) person *A* lies to person *B*, because it is the only way to save person *A*, *B* or *C*'s life or another important good.

20. Let us repeat that Twardowski was convinced that in axiology – including aesthetics – scientific methods may be applied.

In this area, he gave two examples of questions investigated in the domain of experimental (*eo ipso* scientific) aesthetics: the question of the criterion of beauty in art [23] and the question of what is the foundation of the evocative function of music [24].

Experimental aesthetics is made by those who make sets of experiments in order to check aestheticians' hypotheses concerning aesthetical evaluations, or likes and dislikes. One such hypothesis says that "every object is the more beautiful the more evident the golden ratio is in it" [23, p. 341]. Twardowski shows that this hypothesis is, in principal, experimentally confirmed.

Traditionally, "the task of music was seen as recreating and inducing feelings of sadness or happiness in a listener, soothing his soul etc." Twardowski poses the question of how such an evocation may happen. Pleasure occurs as a consequence of listening to music (independently from the text to which it is ascribed), since: (a) listening to music does not require any effort; (b) sounds of music are "pleasant"; (c) by listening to music, one has the sense of "the diversity and homogeneity of a certain number of impressions" [24, p. 346].

Each object which captures a certain diversity in a homogenous whole is beautiful. Moreover, the composition of a given structure (melodic, rhythmic or accord), evokes experiences of a similar structure in hearers.

21. Twardowski was an invaluable teacher and the founder of the greatest, with respect to the number of outstanding members, philosophical school in modern Europe. This is why his pedagogical views deserve interest and respect.